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The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and
Backward-Looking Accounts of Tort Law
MICHAEL PRESSMAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to argue that forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts of tort law are intrinsically compatible with one another.
This theoretical point is of great importance and will bring about a paradigm
shift in tort theory—and, more generally, in legal theory. This is because the
long-standing debate between corrective justice theorists and economic
theorists about the purpose of tort law (with active participants including
Posner, Calabresi, Coleman, Weinrib, Rawls, and countless others) is based
on the universal assumption that forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts of tort law are incompatible. This assumption, however, is false,
and this Article explains why it is false and how so many other authors have
gone wrong.
The contribution of this Article, however, is not limited to this theoretical
point—it also makes important contributions in the practical domain. The
practical implications of the theoretical point are great and threefold: First,
removing the forward-looking / backward-looking non-issue from the table
will allow us to refocus our efforts on the all-important and complex question
of what the substantive legal standard of behavior should be. Second,
recognition of the reason for the compatibility between the forward-looking
and backward-looking aspects of tort law itself provides us with newfound
insight into which factors are relevant to our determination of the best
substantive legal standard. Third, this recognition of the reason for
compatibility not only aids us in the determination of the best substantive
legal standard now, but it provides us with an understanding of what
practical changes we can make to improve society’s welfare going forward.
In sum, in addition to this Article providing groundbreaking theoretical
conclusions, it also offers practical guidance and positive proposals, both of
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which are capable of having a tangible—and substantial—impact on
society’s welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
When a judge decides a case in tort law, the results can be twofold: First,
the dispute between the litigants is resolved, and second, a change may be
made to the law of torts that will affect all future behavior of individuals who
live their lives in the shadow of the law.1 While sometimes this change may
be dramatic, in the vast majority of cases, this change may appear trifling or
insignificant—a minor clarification here, added support for an already wellentrenched principle there. Indeed, even when no change is made, that itself
can be significant. All of these cases constitute additions to the evergrowing ball of wax that is the common law.
Tort law adjudication is not unique with regard to its dual effects. In all
common law disciplines,2 the judiciary knows that what it says will
simultaneously have backward-looking and forward-looking results. This
much is clear. What is less clear is how judges do decide and should decide
tort cases, in light of the dual effects that will result, and this question is the
subject of heated academic debate.
Two main camps have historically dominated this debate, and while
there have been some new variations to arrive on the scene recently,3 the
debate remains largely polarized between these two camps—corrective
1

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was among the first to write about this concept.
According to Holmes, despite the differences between a good man and “the bad
man,” we all bargain in the shadow of the law. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897).
2
This Article will argue, in Part VI, that—despite popular belief to the
contrary—this phenomenon in fact is not unique to common law disciplines.
3
See e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63
STAN. L. REV. 67 (2010); Gregory Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18
LEGAL THEORY 293 (2012); Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective
Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003). For critical commentary on Zipursky’s civil
recourse theory, see generally Richard Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental
Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L. J. 469 (2013); Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil
Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431 (2011); Michael Rustad, Torts
as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433 (2011).
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justice theorists and economic theorists. Ostensibly at issue in this debate is
the question of what is the “fundamental” principle4 or sovereign principle5
of tort law, what tort law at its “core” seeks to do,6 or what tort law is “really
about.”7 On the one hand, economic theorists of tort law think that tort law
is and should be forward-looking, and that it aims to maximize economic
efficiency. On the other hand, the corrective justice theorists think that tort
law is and should be backward-looking and that its goal is to repair wrongful
losses.
This Article will argue that this long-standing debate between corrective
justice theorists and economic theorists is rife with confusion and is based on
a false assumption. This assumption—which both camps mistakenly
make—is that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law
are not compatible with one another. Forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts of tort law are compatible with one another, however, and
the first main goal of this Article will be to explain why we should believe
this theoretical claim. Doing so will, in part, involve explaining how so
many other authors have gone wrong.
The second main goal of this Article will then be to explore the
implications of accepting this theoretical point. The implications are great,
and at least threefold: First, the debate about the forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects of tort law has partially obscured the all-important
and complex question of what the substantive legal standard of behavior
should be. Removing the forward-looking / backward-looking non-issue
from the table will allow us to refocus our efforts on this important and
challenging topic. Second, recognition of the reason for the compatibility
between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law itself
provides us with newfound insight into which factors are relevant to our
determination of the best substantive legal standard. Third, this recognition
of the reason for compatibility not only aids us in the determination of the
best substantive legal standard now, but it provides us with an understanding
of what practical changes we can make to improve society’s welfare going
forward.
Thus, this Article makes important contributions in both the theoretical
and practical domains: First, it makes theoretical points that will bring about
a paradigm shift in tort theory—and, more generally, in legal theory.
Second, it offers practical guidance and positive proposals, both of which are
capable of having a tangible—and substantial—impact on society’s welfare.
Part I begins by describing the economists’ view and the corrective
justice theorists’ view and it explains where precisely the tensions between
4

Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
5
Id. at 62.
6
JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 9, 36 (2001).
7
Zipursky, supra note 3, at 724.
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the two views lie. It also explains how the two camps argue against one
another and what they find unpalatable about the other view. Interestingly,
however, what is unpalatable about one camp’s view to the other, and vice
versa, is not so much an intrinsic feature of the other view, but rather, the
fact that following the other view would at least sometimes lead one to not
adhere to the prescriptions of one’s own view. Further, it seems that in cases
where the two theories yield the same prescription, many proponents of one
theory would likely at least find the goal of the other theory to be a collateral
benefit of deciding the case in accordance with one’s favored theory. In
light of this, one clear assumption made by both camps is that there would in
fact be at least some cases where following the prescriptions of one theory is
incompatible with following the prescriptions of the other. Part I identifies
this assumption and calls into question its truth. Further, it provides some
preliminary reasons to think that the assumption is in fact false. Thus, Part I
suggests that there is reason to think that—due to a key, and almost
universal, misstep—the debate between the two camps is misguided, and that
corrective justice theory is in fact compatible with the economic theory of
tort law. As such, Part I presents a hypothesis that merits further and more
in-depth exploration.
While in the literature on tort it is a forgone conclusion that forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts of tort are incompatible, this is a
generalization, and, as just stated, this potential misstep is only almost
universal. Two exceptions do exist: Richard Posner and John Rawls. Posner
and Rawls both think that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts
can in fact be compatible—for related, but different reasons. Part II
describes and analyzes the positions that Posner and Rawls offer, but
concludes that neither one provides an account that satisfactorily shows that
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort are compatible.
According to Posner, it is plausible to maintain that forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of tort law are compatible, but according to
Posner, the backward-looking aspect of tort law is merely instrumentally
valuable.8 It merely is part of the machinery that enables us to achieve,
through incentive effects on future behavior, what is of intrinsic value—
efficient results for the future. Rawls offers a different account, but one
which similarly holds that the reason for having law and for deciding what in
fact should be a law is only that the system of law in general, and any
specific law in particular, is of intrinsic value in the forward-looking sense.9
According to corrective justice theorists, however, the backward-looking
aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value and is a (or the) reason for having the
system of tort law and for having a particular action be tortious. Thus, Part
II argues that, though both Posner and Rawls attempt to describe accounts
that would render forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the
8
9

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
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law compatible and satisfy both camps, they both fail in this attempt.
Corrective justice theorists would not be willing to sign onto either Posner’s
or Rawls’s accounts.
Part III argues that, despite Posner’s and Rawls’s failed attempts, and
despite the rest of the literature’s failure to even make an attempt, forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are in fact compatible. It
proceeds as follows: Part III begins by clarifying and analyzing the very
meaning of the terms “forward-looking” and “backward-looking.” In order
to assess the truth of the compatibility claim, we must first be sure that we
understand precisely what we mean when we say that the forward-looking
aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value or that the backward-looking aspect is
of intrinsic value. As it happens, neither term is as straightforward as it
seems, and there has been much confusion on this score. Next, Part III flags
a way in which many (if not most) authors have gone astray in debating the
compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law.
In attempts to show the incompatibility of the forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects of the law itself, many authors have, instead,
mistakenly pointed to cases of potential divergence between forward-looking
and backward-looking aspects of a government or legal system on the whole.
This is a mistake because it is orthogonal to the question of compatibility
between the two accounts of the law itself. Part III will illustrate this fallacy
by describing and analyzing scapegoating—the example most commonly
used in these mistaken arguments.
Having laid this groundwork, Part III then delves into the core of the
issue. It argues that the relevant question is whether the forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts would be compatible if we hold fixed substantive
notions of wrongful conduct within the two accounts respectively. In other
words, suppose that behavior that an individual thinks is wrongful and
meriting backward-looking redress in tort is also the type of behavior the
avoidance of which he thinks should constitute societal goals going forward.
Part III argues that, whatever our substantive notion of wrongful conduct
might be, holding people liable for this conduct (and thus bringing about
backward-looking intrinsic value) would also be the way to best deter future
wrongful conduct (and thus bring about forward-looking intrinsic value).
Nevertheless, even if this theoretical compatibility claim is true, it could
be the case, as a practical matter, that people—be they self-proclaimed
corrective justice theorists, economists, or others—do not, as a matter of fact,
subscribe to the same substantive views for both the forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects of tort law. If this were the case, and an
individual had two different substantive views for the two different aspects
of tort, this would suggest that tort law would not simultaneously be able to
fully coincide with such an individual’s forward-looking and backwardlooking views. For such a person, then, it would seem as though a question
would arise as to whether tort law should be an institution that seeks to
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further forward-looking value or backward-looking value, or some mix of
the two. Part IV thus examines the most plausible candidate substantive
views and explores whether it is plausible to maintain either of them as the
substantive notion for both components of one’s forward-looking /
backward-looking view pair. Part IV concludes that it does not currently
seem to be plausible to hold any of the substantive notions for both one’s
forward-looking and backward-looking view.
With these quasi-descriptive conclusions in hand, and after showing that
the practical divergence in fact is much smaller than we might think, Part V
shifts gears and confronts normative questions: Is it good that this is the way
things are? And if the current state of affairs is not ideal, what—if
anything—might we be able to do to improve the situation? It argues that
the answer to the former is that while the status quo is not bad, we would be
better off if our substantive notion of wrongfulness were brought into even
closer alignment with our substantive notion of societal goals. It then
considers various approaches that can be taken to eliminate the divergence
and bring about not only theoretical compatibility but also practical
compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of
tort. Part V argues that this is in fact a possibility and it offers practical
proposals for how to carry out a transformation project of this sort.
Part VI argues that, despite the fact that the forward-looking / backwardlooking debate ostensibly arises in the context of tort, and, more generally,
the common law, it is a mistake—on reflection—for one to hold this view.
Thus, it argues that the issues arising in the statutory context and the
common law context are, contrary to popular belief, very similar and almost
identical. Lastly, the Conclusion offers some parting thoughts.
An important final note before proceeding: The theoretical compatibility
claim itself thus turns out to be of both instrumental and intrinsic value.10
The instrumental importance: If it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of
bringing about the practical convergence that the Article proposes would not
even exist. This convergence would be valuable—and thus the theoretical
claim is of instrumental value. The intrinsic importance: Even if the abovementioned practical convergence were not possible, it is an important
revelation that the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort are
theoretically compatible, because it shows that authors have been grossly
mistaken both about what precisely is at issue in the debate and about where
the action lies in tort law theory. As such, this discovery will bring about
substantially greater clarity and, hopefully, reorient tort scholarship on the
whole to ensure that it is looking—so to speak—in fruitful directions.

10

Strictly speaking, both of these points relate to instrumental value, but one is
considerably more direct, and thus can loosely be described as having intrinsic value.
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I. THE DEBATE BETWEEN ECONOMISTS AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
THEORISTS
A. The Economic Theory
According to the traditional economic view, tort is a forward-looking
institution whose only goal is to provide the correct incentives to bring about
maximally efficient behavior by people in society in the future.11 Thus,
economists generally do not think of tort law in terms of obligations or in
terms of responsibility for harm, but rather, in terms of the minimization of
future costs. As Guido Calabresi famously said, “I take it as axiomatic that
the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”12 More specifically,
economists generally think that the way to reduce these costs is by placing
liability on the “cheapest cost-avoider”—the party best equipped to take the
appropriate precautionary measures.13 Thus, economists think that tort
plaintiffs should recover when they can show that a judgment for the plaintiff
would promote the social interest going forward. Further, economists think
that there should be no judgment for a plaintiff unless a judgment will
minimize accident costs going forward, because the cost of the accident in a
case being litigated is now sunk, and simply holding the defendant
responsible to the plaintiff for that cost will not minimize that cost.14 Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that courts ostensibly make their decisions in
language of “duty,” “breach,” and “proximate cause,” economists think that
courts often are—and most certainly should always be—deciding cases by
engaging in a forward-looking cost-benefit analysis.
In sum, there are two key components of the traditional economic view,
and each component consists of both a normative and a descriptive portion:
First, the law should be forward-looking and the law is forward-looking.15
Second, in looking forward, what we should seek to do is maximize
economic efficiency, and, in looking forward, what we do do is maximize
economic efficiency.16
Interestingly, however, Posner himself has changed his view over the
years, and, instead of espousing a forward-looking view that seeks to
maximize economic efficiency (i.e., maximize wealth), he now espouses a
forward-looking view that seeks to maximize happiness.17 Furthermore,
11

See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
Id. at 26.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 27.
15
See generally id.
16
See generally id.
17
See generally Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: a
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G.
12
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Posner was not alone in making this shift, and the forward-looking
happiness-based view is the typical view shared by the law and economics
movement today.18 In many cases, wealth is still used instrumentally as a
stand-in for happiness, be it as a proxy or for one of various other reasons
why it might be a good intermediate aim. Despite this theoretical change,
however, the practical differences between the traditional view and the
current view are not quite as great as one might think. This is because the
economists in most cases see the cheapest-unhappiness-avoider as being the
party that is the cheapest cost-avoider. Furthermore, the shift in the
economists’ view has not really brought about a change in the debate
between economists and corrective justice theorists—and this is not due to
the fact that the economists’ shift has not brought about a large practical shift
to their view, because even if it had, the new view would still diverge from
the corrective justice view in the same respects in which the traditional view
did. Both economic views disagree with corrective justice views on the
forward-looking / backward-looking issue and on the substantive question of
what our societal goals should be.
In the remainder of this Article, the position that will be attributed to the
economist is the happiness-based view—both because it is the most up-todate version of the economists’ view and because it is a more plausible
version. The term “efficiency,” however, is often used by authors both to
refer to economic efficiency and to happiness-based efficiency, and thus this
term could create confusion. So as to avoid this, this Article will—from
hereon out—use the term “efficiency” to refer to happiness-based efficiency,
unless explicitly stated otherwise.
B. The Corrective Justice Theory
The “corrective justice” approach to tort law is the other main lens
through which tort law is viewed. Corrective justice does not refer to a
single approach, but rather to a family of similar views.19 Among others,
proponents of corrective justice accounts of tort law include George Fletcher,
Richard Epstein, John Borgo, Jules Coleman, and Ernest Weinrib, with
Coleman and Weinrib being the most-often cited.20 Despite there being
differences between their accounts, the convergences are more plentiful than
the divergences, and their views all share the central tenet of the corrective
justice theory: “[T]ort law is best explained by corrective justice” because “at
its core tort law seeks to repair wrongful losses.”21 On this view, tort law is
backward-looking and it involves the claims that one person has against
Owen ed., 1995).
18
Id.
19
Keating, supra note 3, at 298.
20
Id. at 298–99 n.11
21
COLEMAN, supra note 6.
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another person for the rights violations that were the result of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. Thus, tort law aims to return the parties to the equilibrium
that was disturbed by the wrongful conduct. Whether this equilibrium to
which corrective justice seeks to return the parties is itself just, is an
important question, but this is a question for distributive justice. In order to
endorse the importance of corrective justice, one must think that there is an
account of distributive justice that explains the value of a particular
equilibrium point, but the question of corrective justice is nevertheless
independent from the question of distributive justice. Corrective justice
theorists can share the belief that corrective justice is important, yet hold
conflicting theories of distributive justice. What corrective justice theories of
tort law hold in common, though, is the belief that tort law is a backwardlooking institution that aims to repair wrongful losses.22
While economic theorists of torts have argued unrelentingly that
corrective justice theorists are utterly mistaken and that tort law is only
concerned with maximizing efficiency to society going forward, modern
corrective justice theorists have been even more adamant in denying the
plausibility of the economic theory of tort law.23 The idea of assessing
liability between two litigants at bar solely by considering the costs and
benefits for future members of society going forward strikes corrective
justice theorists as unfair and barbaric.24 Characterizing the corrective justice
theorists’ concerns, Gregory Keating writes: “[Deterring] cheapest costavoiders from committing future harms is no more imposing justified
liability in tort than hanging the innocent to deter future crimes is imposing
justified criminal punishment.”25 For corrective justice theorists, forwardlooking concerns simply are (or should be) off the table in tort adjudication.26
While different varieties of this argument from fairness are offered, what
they hold in common is the position that sacrificing the current litigants for
the benefits of future individuals is inappropriate.
In addition to arguing that a forward-looking approach to tort law would
be unfair, corrective justice theorists also argue that the economic account
simply does not square with the facts of what occurs in the tort system.
According to Coleman, if tort were a forward-looking institution, we would
not necessarily create incentives for future members of society by holding
those who commit the tortious wrongs liable.27 This would be an “oddly
22

For an illuminating discussion about the relationship between distributive
justice and corrective justice, see John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 2. The
Place of Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (John
Oberdiek ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
23
See COLEMAN, supra note 6.
24
Id.
25
Keating, supra note 3, at 303.
26
Id.
27
See COLEMAN, supra note 6.
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indirect way of inducing other people to behave appropriately in the future,”
and there would be more direct routes available to accomplish this regulatory
goal.28 Said another way, a concern is that “[e]conomic analysis . . . cannot
offer an equally elegant and persuasive explanation of tort’s adjudicative
structure.”29 Another concern that corrective justice theorists raise for
economic accounts is the fact that tort law adjudication uses concepts that are
essentially backward-looking. Coleman writes: “The relations among the
central concepts of tort law—wrong, duty, responsibility, and repair—are
best understood as expressing the fundamental normative significance of the
victim-injurer relationship as it is expressed in the principle of corrective
justice.”30
Thus, as was the case for the economists’ claims, the corrective justice
theorists’ view is comprised of two key components, and each component
consists of both a normative and descriptive portion: First, the law should not
be and is not forward-looking (but rather, should be and is backwardlooking).31 Second, in looking backward, what we should seek to do and
what we do seek to do is repair wrongful losses.32
C. Preliminary Reasons for Thinking that the Two Theories Are Compatible
Prima facie, corrective justice theory and the traditional economic view
seem to be theories of tort that are conceptually distinct and that might
prescribe different assignments of liability in some, if not many, tort suits.
Nevertheless, both theories might be somewhat attractive in their own right.
Further, in cases where the two theories yield the same prescription, many
proponents of one theory would likely at least find the goal of the other
theory to be a collateral benefit of deciding the case in accordance with one’s
favored theory.33 In other words, a corrective justice theorist, for example,
might consider it to be a happy result of bringing about corrective justice in
case X v. Y, that society’s future behavior will, as a result, lead to a more
efficient allocation of resources. Thus, given that there might be some
attractive aspects to each theory, a question naturally arises: Despite their
apparent differences, is corrective justice theory compatible with the
traditional economic theory of tort law? The common answer has been that
they are not compatible, but this Article will argue that they are.
As discussed, there are two main ways in which the economic theory of
tort is different from the corrective justice theory of tort. First, the economic
theory is forward-looking whereas corrective justice is backward-looking.
28
29
30
31
32
33

Keating, supra note 3, at 303.
Id. at 305.
COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 23.
See Posner, supra note 17, at 99–100.
See id.
There might be some outliers, and Coleman might be one.
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Second, the economic theory explicitly adopts efficiency as a societal goal,
and actions in violation of this goal are what trigger liability (or, according to
Posner, they are what constitute the substantive notion of “wrongful
conduct”).34 Corrective justice theorists, on the other hand, deny that actions
in violation of economic efficiency constitute wrongful conduct, although
they do not provide a clear proposal of what precisely should constitute
wrongful conduct.35
What is striking about the arguments made by corrective justice theorists
is that they often do not carefully distinguish between these two components
of the economic theory of tort law.36 They frequently consider three different
arguments to all be arguments against the economic theory of tort, and they
treat the arguments interchangeably, often equivocating on the term
“economic theory of tort law.” The first set of these arguments is comprised
of arguments against there being a forward-looking aspect of tort law.37 The
second set of these arguments is comprised of arguments against efficiency
as a societal goal (and against the notion of inefficient behavior constituting a
potential substantive notion of “wrongful conduct”).38 Third, there are
arguments against the full economic position—i.e., arguments against the
view of tort that is forward-looking and appeals to efficiency as a societal
goal.39 As a result of this lack of clarity, corrective justice theorists are not as
successful as they think they are in arguing against economists.
Despite making arguments of all three types listed above, corrective
justice theorists seem to be most committed to showing tort to be a
backward-looking institution.40 When they decry forward-looking accounts
of tort law, however, they generally cite the alleged absurdities entailed by
the entire economic position—i.e., the absurdities that they think would
result if tort law were forward-looking and society’s goal were to maximize
economic efficiency.41 While a successful identification of unattractive
aspects of the full economic position would certainly give reason to doubt the
full economic account, identifying these unattractive aspects would not
necessarily give reason to doubt a forward-looking account of tort law that is
not encumbered by a notion of efficiency.
34
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As discussed above, one of the main concerns articulated by corrective
justice theorists is that a forward-looking tort law would prescribe
unattractive results—for example, the sacrifice of the rights or welfare of a
litigant for the benefit of future members of society.42 This, of course,
assumes that a forward-looking tort law would prescribe different results.
Perhaps there might be cases where the full economic account would
prescribe different results than would the backward-looking and nonefficiency-based notion of corrective justice, but it is not clear that the
forward-looking and backward-looking natures of the two accounts are
contributing at all to the diverging prescriptions. If we hold the substantive
notion of “wrongful conduct” constant—be it an efficiency notion or a more
murky corrective justice notion—it is far from clear that forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts would ever yield different prescriptions in tort
suits.
In light of these suspicions, this Article will now explore the question of
whether the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are
in fact compatible.
II. POSNER’S AND RAWLS’S COMPATIBILITY CLAIMS
As mentioned in Part I, in the vast majority of the literature on tort, it is a
forgone conclusion that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of
tort are incompatible.43 Two exceptions exist, however: Posner and Rawls.
Posner and Rawls both think that forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts can in fact be compatible—for related, but different reasons.44 This
Part will describe and analyze the positions that Posner and Rawls offer, and
it will conclude that neither one provides an account that satisfactorily shows
that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort are compatible.
A. Posner’s Compatibility Claim
According to Posner, the connection between corrective justice and the
economic theory of tort law is a deep one. He writes: “Once the concept of
corrective justice is given its correct Aristotelian meaning, it becomes
possible to show that it is not only compatible with, but required by, the
economic theory of law.”45 To support this point, Posner sets out to interpret
Aristotle’s pioneering discussion of corrective justice in Book V, Chapter 4
of the Nicomachean Ethics.46 In doing so, he finds much that lies in common
42
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between Aristotelian corrective justice and its descendants—current
corrective justice theories.47 Posner’s research into Aristotelian notions of
corrective justice, however, reveals one key feature of corrective justice that
is emphasized in the Aristotelian account, but which Posner considers to be
largely overlooked by current accounts: “[C]orrective justice is a procedural
principle: the meaning of wrongful conduct must be sought elsewhere.”48
For Aristotle, seeking to carry out corrective justice would not in and of itself
determine what should be done.49 In order to know what corrective justice
calls for, one would have to appeal to a notion of “wrongful conduct,” and
determining what constitutes “wrongful conduct” is an inquiry to be carried
out independently. Thus, according to Posner, the Aristotelian notion of
corrective justice can be filled in with any notion of “wrongful conduct,” and
thus it is compatible with any account of what constitutes “wrongful
conduct.”50 As Posner notes, Aristotle does delineate an account of
“wrongful conduct” in Chapter 8 of Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, but
Aristotle makes clear that corrective justice would be compatible with other
accounts.51 Further, Aristotle’s own account of “wrongful conduct” is not
broad enough to include negligent behavior, and thus even current corrective
justice theorists—who do want to think of negligence as potentially wrongful
conduct—supply their own non-Aristotelian concept of “wrongful
conduct.”52
Given this analysis of Aristotle, Posner believes that corrective justice is
both compatible with and required by the economic theory of tort law.53 It is
compatible with the economic theory, according to Posner, because
economics simply provides a substantive notion of wrongful conduct that can
fill in the void provided by Aristotle’s procedural principle.54 According to
Posner, the substantive notion of wrongful conduct imported by economics is
“justice as efficiency.”55 On this account, any action that does not maximize
efficiency is wrongful: “If A fails to take precautions that would cost56 less
than their expected benefits in accident avoidance, thus causing an accident
in which B is injured . . . the concept of justice as efficiency will be
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violated.”57 Thus, the forward-looking economic account can be understood
as an account that is compatible with corrective justice.
Posner also argues that corrective justice is required by the economic
theory of tort. As Posner says, “justice as efficiency” cannot be brought
about unless incentives are created to ensure that people act in accordance
with this principle.58 This, Posner says, requires that we administer
corrective justice in cases where parties violate the principle.59 Thus, unless
the wrongs are rectified, the economic theory of law is unable to function.
Anticipating criticism, Posner considers an important objection at the end
of his article. As he says, one might think that corrective justice and
economic theory are in fact incompatible, because while they both result in
the similar forms of redress, “they do so for different reasons.”60 One might
think that the economic theorist carries out corrective justice merely in order
to maximize efficiency going forward, while the Aristotelian carries out
corrective justice in order to promote some notion of backward-looking
justice.61 As Posner argues, though, this comparison is mistaken.62 In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not explain the rationale of carrying out
corrective justice or explain the end goal, but, rather, he merely explains
what corrective justice is, and that there is a duty to carry out corrective
justice.63 Thus, Posner concludes that it is perfectly coherent to understand
corrective justice as an instrumental good—a good that is important because
of the future benefits it will bring about.64 For Posner, corrective justice is a
good because it is an instrument used to affect incentives influencing future
behavior, thus bringing about the incentives that will be most efficient.65 The
resulting maximization of happiness, Posner says, is the “ultimate objective
of the just state.”66
While perhaps Posner accomplishes the goal of his paper (demonstrating
the compatibility of the economic theory of tort and the Aristotelian notion of
corrective justice), the conclusion is not as satisfying as we might hope. He
does not demonstrate the compatibility of the economic theory of tort and
current notions of corrective justice—notions that, unlike Aristotle’s, do
articulate a rationale for corrective justice: the intrinsic value of backwardlooking justice. Posner concedes as much, saying that he has “limited
discussion to Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice and other concepts
57
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might lead to other results, perhaps inconsistent with the economic
approach.”67 Nevertheless, Posner takes himself to have accomplished two
important tasks. First, he has shown that corrective justice, in its original
form, is compatible with economic theory, and second, he believes he has
shifted the burden to current corrective justice theorists to “explain and
justify their unorthodox usage” of the term “corrective justice.”68 Posner
thinks that once modern corrective justice theorists attempt to explain and
justify their usage, they will realize that they do subscribe to the Aristotelian
view, and to the extent that this is the case, they will realize that corrective
justice is compatible with the economic theory of tort law.69
The problem for Posner, however, is that it’s far from obvious that he has
succeeded in shifting the burden to modern corrective justice theorists. Or, if
he has, it’s not obvious that modern corrective justice theorists have been
unable to meet the challenge. Strong reasons have been provided for
thinking that corrective justice is intrinsically valuable, or at least that the
backward-looking equilibrium that it seeks to restore is intrinsically valuable.
Further, it’s not clear what hangs on modern corrective justice theorists
justifying “their unorthodox usage” of the term “corrective justice.”70
Whatever it is that the current corrective justice theorists want to call their
position, it seems clear that a tenet of this position is that corrective justice is
intrinsically valuable. To the extent that this is the case, Posner’s view seems
to be that modern corrective justice theory and the economic theory of tort
are incompatible. He thinks that corrective justice is merely an instrument
for affecting incentives that influence future behavior, and, more specifically,
for bringing about the incentives that will be most efficient.71
B. Rawls’s Compatibility Claim
In his seminal article, Two Concepts of Rules, John Rawls takes up the
question of the relationship between forward-looking and backward-looking
aspects of the law—as well as the backward-looking and forward-looking
aspects of other practices, such as promising.72 Rawls’s discussion of the law
focuses on the context of the criminal law and not tort law, but his points
apply analogously to the context of tort law if the appropriate substitutions
are made (e.g., substitute corrective justice for retributivism).73 While there
are some differences between the two contexts, Rawls takes his points to
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apply broadly enough to encompass the backward-looking and forwardlooking debate in the context of tort law.
Framing the debate, Rawls writes:
For our purposes we may say that there are two
justifications of punishment.
What we may call the
retributive view is that punishment is justified on the
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally
fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in
proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be
punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the
appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act.
The state of affairs where wrongdoer suffers punishment is
morally better than the state of affairs where he does not . . .
.
What we may call the utilitarian view holds that on the
principle that bygones are bygones and that only future
consequences are material to present decisions, punishment
is justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences
of maintaining it as one of the devices of the social order.
Wrongs committed in the past are, as such, not relevant
considerations for deciding what to do. If punishment can be
shown to promote effectively the interest of society it is
justifiable, otherwise it is not.
I have stated these two competing views very roughly to
make one feel the conflict between them: one feels the force
of both arguments and one wonders how they can be
reconciled.74
Having posed the challenge of reconciling the two conflicting, yet
independently forceful, arguments, Rawls famously offers the following
solution, which merits a lengthy quotation:
One can say . . . that the judge and the legislator stand in
different positions and looking different directions: one to
the past, the other to the future. The justification of what the
judge does, qua judge, sounds like the retributive view; the
justification of what the (ideal) legislator does, qua
legislator, sounds like the utilitarian view . . . . The answer,
then, to the confusion engendered by the two views of
punishment is quite simple: one distinguishes two offices,
that of the judge and that of the legislator, and one
74
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distinguishes their different stations with respect to the
system of rules which make up the law; and then one notes
that the different sorts of considerations which would usually
be offered as reasons for what is done under the cover of
these offices can be paired off with the competing
justifications of punishment. One reconciles the two views
by the time-honored device of making them apply to
different situations.
But can it really be this simple? Well, this answer
allows for the apparent intent of each side. Does a person
who advocates the retributive view necessarily advocate, as
an institution, legal machinery whose essential purpose is to
set up and preserve correspondence between turpitude and
suffering? Surely not. What retributionists have rightly
insisted upon is that no man can be punished unless he is
guilty, that is, unless he has broken the law. Their
fundamental criticism of the utilitarian account is that, as
they interpret it, it sanctions an innocent person’s being
punished (if one may call it that) for the benefit of society.
On the other hand, utilitarians agree that punishment is
to be inflicted only for the violation of law. They regard this
much as understood from the concept of punishment itself.
The point of the utilitarian account concerns the institution
as a system of rules: utilitarianism seeks to limit its use by
declaring it justifiable only if it can be shown to foster
effectively the good of society. Historically it is a protest
against the indiscriminate and ineffective use of the criminal
law. It seeks to dissuade us from assigning to penal
institutions the improper, if not sacrilegious, task of
matching suffering with moral turpitude. Like others,
utilitarians want penal institutions designed so that, as far as
humanly possible, only those who break the law run afoul of
it. They hold that no official should have discretionary
power to inflict penalties whenever he thinks it for the
benefit of society; for on utilitarian grounds an institution
granting such power could not be justified.75
In many ways, what Rawls says is similar to what Posner says. Both
authors think that the legal institution itself is justified by forward-looking
concerns—as Rawls says, the “institution as a system of rules” is justified by
75
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utilitarianism, which holds “the principle that bygones are bygones and that
only future consequences are material to present decisions.”76 Further, both
think that the backward-looking aspect of the law is necessary in order to
carry out the institution’s forward-looking goals, and both think that this is
the only reason why there is a backward-looking aspect of the law.77 Their
views about the backward-looking aspect of the law do seem to differ
somewhat, however. For Posner, the backward-looking aspect of tort law
has no intrinsic value—it is merely valuable instrumentally.78 Rawls,
however, offers a more nuanced account. He thinks that the reason we have
a backward-looking aspect of the law is merely that it enables the
institution—justified by forward-looking considerations—to function,79 but
he seems to think that, once we have the law, it creates intrinsic backwardlooking value, to which a retributivist would rightfully appeal.80 In other
words, Rawls seems to think that the existence of the law brings into
existence intrinsic backward-looking values, and, in light of the existence of
the legal system, the law now has backward-looking and forward-looking
aspects that are both of intrinsic value. This account certainly seems to be
closer than Posner’s to an account that truly exhibits full compatibility
between the intrinsically forward-looking and the intrinsically backwardlooking aspects of tort, but it still seems to fall short.
Rawls thinks that this account will appease both self-proclaimed
utilitarians and self-proclaimed retributivists, but this seems doubtful, and
especially with respect to the retributivist. In the passage quoted above,
Rawls writes: “Does a person who advocates the retributive view necessarily
advocate, as an institution, legal machinery whose essential purpose is to set
up and preserve correspondence between turpitude and suffering? Surely
not.”81 This seems to be mistaken. As has been discussed (in the context of
tort law, but the same points apply here), corrective justice theorists think
that the very purpose of tort law, as an institution is to carry out corrective
justice82—in other words, return society to the equilibrium at which it rested
before having been disturbed by the wrongful conduct. Furthermore, it
seems implausible to suggest that moral norm of corrective justice is solely a
function of the existence of a legal norm of corrective justice.83 Even
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without a legal system carrying out corrective justice, it seems that we would
have moral intuitions about the appropriateness of redress for wrongful
inflictions of harm. To a certain extent, however, Rawls does seem to be
onto something when he suggests that backward-looking legal norms could
bring about backward-looking moral norms: It does seem possible that
people’s sense of morality is at least somewhat a function of the law. In
other words, people tend to think to some degree that breaking the law is a
form of free riding and, as a default, it seems to be that one might think that
breaking the law is immoral. Thus, it does seem as though Rawls is right in
identifying the phenomenon that the law affects people’s moral intuitions.84
This is an illuminating point, and also hard to deny. This notwithstanding,
however, it also seems implausible to deny what Rawls himself denies: that
our moral intuitions regarding corrective justice and retribution exist
independently of the law, and part of the reason that we have the law is
because of the fact that we have these backward-looking intrinsic values.85
In his article, Rawls does not go as far as to state explicitly that it would
be incompatible for the law’s purpose to be intrinsically backward-looking
and also intrinsically forward-looking, but we can infer as much from what
he does say. He sets out to reconcile the forward-looking and backwardlooking justifications for the law, and he concludes that one can do so if one
employs “the time-honored device of making them apply to different
situations.”86 This does not say explicitly that we need to use this “timehonored device,” but it would certainly be a much simpler and much more
straightforward reconciliation to simply show that the two justifications
simultaneously apply in all of the same situations. Thus, if Rawls thought he
could show that the justifications applied in the same situations, he would not
resort to the “time-honored device.” Furthermore, Rawls does explicitly say
that, upon reflection, a retributivist would concede that he does not believe
that the backward-looking values that he espouses apply to the legal system
as a whole.87
Having just discussed Rawls’s account of retributivism and the
backward-looking aspect of the law, we see that Rawls is not espousing an
account of the law on which the backward-looking aspect of the law is truly
of intrinsic value—and thus he is not espousing an account of the law on
which forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of the law are each
truly of intrinsic value. Thus, Rawls is not arguing that forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of the law are wholly compatible in the way that
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this Article will argue (in Part III) that they are.88 Having thus already
determined the answer to the question of whether Rawls offers a satisfactory
explanation of how forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the
law can be compatible, we need not investigate whether Rawls’s account of
the utilitarian position is plausible in order to arrive at an answer to the
compatibility question. This notwithstanding, it is worth briefly considering
the plausibility of Rawls’s account of the utilitarian position, because the
points raised and discussed here will lay the foundations for discussions in
Part III.B and Part V.
Would a utilitarian be satisfied with Rawls’s so-called reconciliation, or
would he be dissatisfied just as the retributivist would be? A utilitarian
would agree with Rawls that the justification of the institution as a whole
(and, more specifically, the decisions made by the legislator himself) is, and
should be, justified by forward-looking considerations. The question that
arises for the utilitarian is whether he would sign on to Rawls’s claim that
when it comes to the role of the judge, qua judge, forward-looking
considerations should not apply, and that this is the realm merely of
backward-looking considerations. In other words, would someone who
thinks that the purpose of tort law is to bring about the best result for society
going forward think that Rawls’s system stays true to, and accomplishes, this
goal? Or would he think that Rawls’s seeming concession means that his
account is sacrificing at least some forward-looking benefits and thus
straying somewhat from the position that tort should bring about the best
results for society going forward?
At first, it might seem that a utilitarian would want not only that there be
an efficiency analysis carried out at the level of creating the legal institution
and at the level of legislation, but also at the level of the judge. The forwardlooking thinker seemingly would want all decisions to be made based on
forward-looking considerations. Rawls, however, points out that a system
that allowed all decisions throughout the system to be made according to
efficiency analyses would be self-defeating—it would lead to a less efficient
result overall.89 As an example, he asks that we imagine an institution called
“telishment . . . which is such that the officials set up by it have authority to
arrange a trial for the condemnation of an innocent man whenever they are of
the opinion that doing so would be in the best interest of society.”90 This
would be an institution where officers at all levels, and not merely the
legislators, are carrying out efficiency analyses. According to Rawls, as a
practical matter, there are numerous reasons for why this would be an
88
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inefficient system on utilitarian terms.91 To name two: First, people would
constantly be in fear of being telished even if they had not committed a
crime, and second, people wouldn’t know what their attitudes should be
towards people who have been telished, because they wouldn’t know
whether these people were people who committed the crimes and thus would
be punished under an institution of punishment or whether they were
innocent and while appropriately telished, would not be appropriately
punished.92 Interestingly, this reasonable conclusion that Rawls draws
seemingly relies for support in part (though certainly not in full) on what
Rawls denies—that we have pre-legal notions and intuitions regarding the
backward-looking view of corrective justice and retribution.93
Thus, Rawls thinks that even a utilitarian, in designing an institution,
while designing it to be as efficient in utilitarian terms as possible, would
thus not design a system in which a utility calculus would be carried out by
all offices.94 As such, given these practical considerations, it seems that a
utilitarian would choose to design his system in a rule utilitarian manner—
by creating rules that would not be mere rules of thumb, but which would
exist to be followed without exception, because the system in which this
occurs would be the one that would be best on the whole.95 These rules
91
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would take the form of laws as well as other administrative policies and
regulations regarding prosecutions, investigations, and other administrative
tasks of officers of the state.
One might ask, however, whether this type of a system is really the
system that would maximize utility. Perhaps, one might say, a system of
telishment would be inefficient because of all the disvalue resulting from the
fact that people know that it is the policy that is in effect, and thus an ideal
system would be one in which utility calculations do occur by all officers of
the state, but in which the general population does not know that this is the
case.96 Suppose, for example, that the government from time to time takes
part in scapegoating, where the government frames an innocent individual of
a crime so as to avert a riot that would have caused an enormous amount of
harm. If carried out successfully, this would seemingly be efficient. While
Rawls concedes this, he thinks that practical factors (such as how to
successfully keep the truth private) will prevent such a non-transparent
regime from being feasible and remaining non-transparent, and thus
successful.97 In light of these considerations, and in light of the disutility
associated with a system of telishment, Rawls seems to be right that a
forward-looking theorist would likely be satisfied with Rawls’s
“reconciliation.”98
III. THE COMPATIBILITY OF FORWARD-LOOKING AND BACKWARD-LOOKING
ACCOUNTS OF TORT LAW
A.

The Meaning of the Terms “Forward-Looking” and “BackwardLooking”

According to Posner, it was plausible to maintain that forward-looking
and backward-looking accounts of tort law are compatible, but the backwardlooking aspect of tort law is merely instrumentally valuable.99 It merely is
part of the machinery that enables us to achieve, through incentive effects on
future behavior, what is of intrinsic value—efficient results for the future.
Rawls offers a different account, but one which similarly holds that the
reason for having law and for deciding what in fact should be a law is only
where the court carried out forward-looking efficiency analyses. Thus, it seems that
the current system, though it raise issues commonly raised in the context of rule
utilitarianism, will be able to be defended with a cogent explanation of why it is not
unstable in the way that rule utilitarianism is.
96
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that the system of law in general, and any specific law in particular, is of
intrinsic value in the forward-looking sense.100 According to corrective
justice theorists, however, the backward-looking aspect of tort law is of
intrinsic value and is a (or the) reason for having the system of tort law and
for having a particular action be tortious. This Article so far has suggested
that it could be the case that tort law can simultaneously be intrinsically
forward-looking and intrinsically backward-looking. In other words, these
two claims might be compatible.
In order to assess the truth of this possibility, we must first be sure that
we understand precisely what we mean when we say that the forwardlooking aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value or that the backward-looking
aspect is of intrinsic value. As it happens, though, neither term is as
straightforward as it seems. Further, the former seemingly is much more
straightforward than the latter. To say that the forward-looking aspect of tort
law is of intrinsic value is simply to say that it is good in and of itself to bring
about good results going forward—with the term “good results” being left to
be filled in with one’s preferred substantive notion of societal good.
It is less clear what one might mean if one says that the backwardlooking aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value. Why is this unclear? First
off, the term itself is somewhat confusing: Despite the fact that it’s called
“backward-looking,” clearly whatever value is brought about by the
disposition in the tort case will not affect the past. The past has passed us by.
Thus it’s important to be clear that the theory is merely backward-looking—
as opposed to backward-affecting or something of this sort. While this much
might seem obvious, the immediate implication of this might not be. Since
whatever backward-looking value is brought about by the case’s disposition
will occur at or after the time of the conclusion of the case, this value—
whatever it turns out to be and to whomever it turns out to accrue—will have
to be included in the forward-looking account’s calculus as well. As such, at
this early stage of the analysis, there already seems to be some evidence that
the backward-looking and forward-looking views might not be related quite
in the way that it has been thought they are.
One could deny that a court’s judgment in favor of a tort plaintiff would
affect the events of the past while still maintaining that the value of the
judgment in some sense is in the past or attaches to past events or states of
affairs. This is not incoherent—and in fact some writers do seem to
articulate a view along these lines101 —but it seems much more plausible to
suggest that the value of the court’s judgment accrues at or after the time of
the judgment. Further, if a decision is bringing about value at or after the
time of the judgment, it seems that this value must be experienced by
particular people, as a function of the improved experience, on net, of these
individuals. This too could be denied, and thus there might be people who
100
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would hold that the backward-looking value does occur at or after the
judgment, but that it is a value that applies to society on the whole, and not to
individual people. Thus, there are at least three views one might hold about
what the backward-looking value actually is, but it seems that the most
plausible version is the version that describes overall value as a function of
the value added to particular lives—after all, it seems that everything that is
valuable to us is valuable to us because of its effect on lives. At the very
least, however, even if one did espouse one of the two views that appear to
be less plausible, it seems that these other views could be characterized as
merely an additional way of describing the very same set of facts as those on
which the value accrues to particular individuals in the present and future. In
light of these points, it seems reasonable to proceed within a framework in
which backward-looking value must be experienced by particular people as a
function of the improved experience, on net, of these individuals.
The question then becomes: To whom does this backward-looking value
accrue? The clearest answer here is that the plaintiff—who was wronged and
who has now recovered his losses—is the one who gets this value. Cases
will vary, but it is also likely that individuals who are unrelated to the case
but who have heard about the wrong that was inflicted on (or befell) the
plaintiff will get value from hearing of the judgment in the plaintiff’s favor
and against the defendant. In some cases this value gotten by third parties
might take the form not of greater well-being, but rather, the form of averting
the negative feelings they might have had if they had become aware of a
decision in favor of the defendant.
At this point it is important to make a few general points. First, this
backward-looking value of a tort judgment, importantly, is an intrinsic value.
According to Posner, the backward-looking aspect of a tort case was valuable
only for instrumental reasons—in particular, tort judgments against tortious
defendants would bring about the appropriate incentives to maximize
efficiency going forward.102 The backward-looking value discussed here,
though, is intrinsic. It is valuable in and of itself. Second, in light of the fact
that both backward-looking and forward-looking intrinsic values occur after
the tort judgment, it is important to make clear what the distinction is
between the two. A backward-looking intrinsic value, according to the
analysis here, is a value that accrues to individuals after the court’s decision,
but which is a function either of a plaintiff’s financial gain or of an
individual’s—be it the plaintiff’s or a third party’s—sentiments regarding the
fairness, appropriateness, or general fittingness of the court’s judgment, in
light of the wrongness of the events that gave rise to the lawsuit. This is
what it means for the value to be backward-looking.
A forward-looking intrinsic value, on the other hand, can now be
understood in two different ways—seemingly both of which had been
102
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assumed beforehand to be equal. First, we can understand the forwardlooking intrinsic value to be the value brought about to society going forward
that is due to the incentives and actions brought about as a result of the
expectations that liability will in the future be applied as it was in this case.
In other words, this is the value brought about by how people will act in the
shadow of the recent addition to (or entrenchment, or clarification, or
specification of, or zero change at all to) the law. On the other hand, we can
understand the forward-looking intrinsic value to be the value brought about
for society going forward in total, regardless of the value’s mechanism or the
form it takes. The difference between these two forward-looking measures
of intrinsic value is that the first one does not include the backward-looking
intrinsic value, whereas the second one does.
Which of these two forward-looking intrinsic value measures, then, will
be the one that is relevant for the inquiry into whether the forward-looking
and backward-looking aspects of tort law can each simultaneously be of
intrinsic value? Both measures could be relevant in different ways, as will
become clear in Part V, but, for the time being, we need not choose, and this
is for the following reason: Even if the relevant comparison were only
between the backward-looking account and the more inclusive of the two
forward-looking accounts, unless the backward-looking intrinsic value of a
judgment outweighed the value of the narrower of the two forward-looking
accounts in every single case where the backward-looking and the inclusive
forward-looking views allegedly cut in opposite directions (assuming,
arguendo, what this article denies, that any cases of divergence exist), there
wouldn’t be full compatibility between the backward-looking intrinsic value
and the inclusive forward-looking intrinsic value. Further, if there are or
were cases of divergence between the backward-looking value and the
narrow forward-looking value, there is no reason to think that, in every single
case, the narrow forward-looking value would be moot because it would be
outweighed by the backward-looking value. None of the writers who argue
that forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort can diverge think
that the narrow forward-looking value would be outweighed by the
backward-looking value in every possible case.103
Thus, if the claim that the backward-looking intrinsic value is compatible
with the forward-looking intrinsic value is true, then the backward-looking
intrinsic value will have to be compatible with both versions of the forwardlooking intrinsic value claim. This, recall, is because the compatibility claim
is not a claim that forward-looking intrinsic value and backward-looking
intrinsic value accounts of tort law can be compatible in a tort case (i.e., that
there is a possible case in which both would have intrinsic value), but, rather,
that they go hand in hand—that in any case where one has intrinsic value, the
other one does as well.
103

See COLEMAN, supra note 6.

2016

TORT LAW

71

B. The Distinction Between “The Law Itself” and “The Legal System on the
Whole”
Despite the fact that both Posner’s and Rawls’s discussions are about the
possibility of there being compatibility between forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts, it’s interesting to note that there is a very
important way in which the subject matter they address is distinct. Posner
addresses the question of whether there is compatibility between forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts of the law itself, whereas Rawls
addresses the question of whether there is compatibility between forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts of the whole legal system. Both of
these questions are interesting, important, and worthy of investigation and
discussion in their own right, but it is crucial to distinguish between them.
Though neither Posner nor Rawls necessarily is guilty of claiming to discuss
one while in fact discussing or drawing conclusions about the other, neither
author distinguishes their question from the related one that they are not
addressing. Rawls does make the distinction between justifying an
institution and justifying a particular execution of a rule, but, surprisingly, he
does not distinguish his inquiry from an inquiry into the backward-looking
and forward-looking aspects of the law itself.104 As such, since the
justification of the execution of a particular rule is a question under the
umbrella of justifying the institution as a whole, questions regarding the
backward-looking and forward-looking aspects of the law itself go
untouched. As a result of Posner’s and Rawls’s failure to distinguish their
question from the question they are not addressing, the distinction has gone
somewhat unnoticed, and many future authors have muddied the waters by
mistakenly treating the two questions interchangeably, and thus,
unsurprisingly, have come to unwarranted conclusions.105 In light of this,
some further clarification will be helpful.
In what follows, this section will address various points that, though not
discussed by Posner and Rawls, relate to the material that they do discuss,
and are natural issues given rise to by Rawls’s distinction between justifying
an institution and justifying a particular execution of a rule. The section will
argue that we need to be clear and explicit about the distinction between
claims about the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of a
government or legal regime on the whole (and compatibility between the
two) and claims about the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects
(and compatibility between the two) of the law (or even more specifically, a
particular law). The law is one of many aspects of a government or legal
regime. Among the extremely numerous other tasks a government has are
104
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the following three: prosecutions, investigations, and behavior by law
enforcement and administrative officers.
In creating a governmental institution, it seems that people will want to
create the best possible institution, defined according to some metric of
goodness. In what follows, this section will take maximizing happiness as
the maximandum, but analogous accounts can be described. Thus, for our
purposes, suppose that someone justifying a governmental institution will
want to maximize happiness. As described in Part III.A, this can be
understood as the more inclusive version (or the all-things-considered
version) of the forward-looking view. This inclusive forward-looking view
of the institution will be similar to the inclusive forward-looking view of the
law, in the sense that it will be made up of a backward-looking component
and also a narrow forward-looking component. As was the case with the
backward-looking account of the law itself, the backward-looking account of
the legal institution on the whole will be the intrinsic value or disvalue
brought about due to the sentiments regarding fairness to the litigants in the
case at bar. The narrow forward-looking component in the context of value
of the legal institution as a whole, however, will be different from the narrow
forward-looking component in the context of the law itself. The latter was
defined as benefits being brought about due to how people would act due to
incentive effects of the law. The narrow forward-looking component in the
context of the value of the legal institution as a whole, however, is not
focused on changes in incentives brought about by a new law, since there
might not be a new law, but rather, more broadly, on all effects of a decision.
In the case of scapegoating, for example, there is no difference in the law that
is brought about that affects one behavior. Rather, people’s behavior is
affected by their factual beliefs being different than they otherwise would be,
and thus their emotions and motivations being different than they would be,
but the changes in these beliefs and emotions are not precipitated by a change
in the law itself.
Thus, consider once again Rawls’s scapegoating case.106 If scapegoating
(or something that is similar in relevant respects) were carried out
successfully in the hypothetical cases that corrective justice theorists are
concerned about, this would seemingly maximize forward-looking results in
the inclusive sense. It would have a bad backward-looking result for he who
knew the truth (i.e., the victim of the scapegoating), but, as stipulated, it
would bring about narrow forward-looking benefits that outweigh this
backward-looking disvalue, and thus the inclusive forward-looking result
would be positive. Thus, since in this type of a case the government on the
whole’s actions have a positive narrow forward-looking effect but a negative
backward-looking effect, this is a clear example of a case that illustrates the
possibility of a divergence between the forward-looking and backward106
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looking aspects of a government’s actions. At the very least, there will not
always be compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking
aspects of the actions of a government or legal regime on the whole.
While perhaps a scapegoating case here and there would be likely to be
feasible, however, it seems that a system that includes a greater amount of
something like scapegoating (or even more extremely, a system that institutes
Rawls’s telishment) will bring about great anxiety and on the whole will not
maximize happiness. This is an empirical question, but Rawls’s point to this
effect seems plausible. It seems quite possible that a society that maximizes
happiness will be one that is transparent and that has law and that holds
people liable if and only if they have violated laws.107
Thus, though there might be potential divergences between backwardlooking and (narrow) forward-looking accounts of a government, it seems
possible that it might be the case that a government that in fact will be
desirable according to either the backward-looking or (narrow) forwardlooking account might always be desirable according to both. In other
words, perhaps it might be the case that there is full compatibility between
(narrow) forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of a government
in governments that are desirable—i.e., where the inclusive forward-looking
result is positive. Thus, the question now is whether this would in fact be the
case.
This, then, is what brings us to the question of whether there is
compatibility between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of
the law itself. What ultimately matters to proponents of the forward-looking
account and proponents of the backward-looking account is whether the
society we live in has a government whose effect, on the whole, is consistent
with the forward-looking or backward-looking account, respectively. Thus,
if it is in fact the case that the types of societies discussed above—that are
not transparent, governed by law, and holding people liable if and only if
they have violated laws—are not desirable, we need not concern ourselves
with these. The question then becomes whether societies that do meet these
constraints have complete compatibility between the forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects, and this will thus depend on the question of
whether forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the law itself are
compatible. Thus, the question now is: Are the backward-looking and
forward-looking accounts of the law (or, more specifically, tort law)
compatible?
This foregoing discussion shows us two things. First, it explains the
relationship between the compatibility question, as it pertains to the legal
regime on the whole, and the compatibility question, as it pertains to the
content of the law itself. This explains why the latter question is important,
since, in practice, answering it is a means to answering the former question—
107
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and the former question is the broader and deeper one. Thus, we see the
importance of the debate about the compatibility of forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of the law itself. Secondly, and perhaps even
more importantly for this Article’s purposes, this discussion flags a way in
which many (if not most) authors have gone astray in debating the
compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the law
itself—and this, specifically, is the debate in the literature that this Article
has taken as its focus. In their attempts to show the incompatibility of the
forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of the law itself, authors have
mistakenly pointed to cases of potential divergence between forward-looking
and backward-looking aspects of a government or legal system on the
whole.108 This is a mistake, and this does not in any way speak to the
question of compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts of the law itself. The paradigmatic example that illustrates this
mistake is the way in which authors use the scapegoating case to draw
inferences about the compatibility of the forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts of the law itself.109
Thus, going forward, if we are able to identify these mistakes and avoid
making them, this will allow us to approach the compatibility question
regarding the law itself with a much clearer lens. Now armed with this
clearer lens, we turn to an unobstructed exploration of this question.
C. The Compatibility Claim
Having clarified what we mean by the intrinsic value of the backwardlooking aspect of tort and the intrinsic value of the forward-looking aspect of
tort, and having distinguished the compatibility question regarding the law
itself from the compatibility question regarding the government or legal
system on the whole, we are now able to delve into the meat of the issue.
The question now becomes whether the forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts would be compatible if we hold fixed a substantive notion
of wrongful conduct for the two accounts. In other words, suppose that
behavior that we think is wrongful and meriting backward-looking redress in
tort is also the type of behavior the avoidance of which we think should
constitute societal goals going forward. Whether this supposition is a
practical one will be addressed in greater detail in Part IV, but, for the time
being, we will assume that it is and ask whether there would ever be a
divergence between the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts if
this were the case.
Let’s begin by considering two (of many) possible frameworks for how a
society might define the substantive notion of wrongful conduct and the
corresponding substantive notion of what should constitute societal goals
108
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going forward. One such framework is one in which society’s goal is
maximizing efficiency.110 Another such framework is one in which society
aims to minimize instances of wrongful conduct of a more murky sort that is
commonly alluded to by corrective justice theorists.
1. The efficiency-based substantive account
First, let’s consider the efficiency framework, where Posner’s article has
already done most of the work. As Posner discusses, if tort law is to be
forward-looking and also aim to maximize efficiency, tort law will aim to
make people internalize the externalities they impose on others.111 This will
be accomplished by holding people liable in tort for the costs they impose on
others when their conduct violates the principle of justice-as-efficiency—
when the total costs of their conduct outweigh the total benefits of their
conduct. This way, assuming that behavior of this sort is detectable enough,
tort law will provide people with the incentives necessary to maximize
efficiency—at least in broad strokes. Furthermore, if the substantive notion
of wrongful conduct adhered to by the society is that wrongful behavior is
behavior that violates justice-as-efficiency, then it is precisely in the cases
where liability will be needed to bring about good incentives that people will
feel that there is a wrong that, for moral reasons, deserves redress. In other
words, the very cases where liability will be prescribed by the forwardlooking account of intrinsic value will be the same cases where liability will
be prescribed by a backward-looking account of intrinsic value.
Furthermore, at least at first glance, this convergence between the
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts seems to make some sense.
It doesn’t immediately seem implausible that if society’s goal were to
maximize efficiency, then it would be precisely these actions (in violation of
justice-as-efficiency) that we might, as a matter of psychological fact, think
are wrongful. Acts of this sort, we might say, are acts that are selfish, and
acts where the agent does not show sufficient regard for the interests of
others. Further, it seems possible that there might simply be one thought or
intuition that lies behind, causes, and manifests itself in both the forwardlooking view and the backward-looking efficiency views. They might be
different manifestations of the same view. It’s important to note, again, that
unlike with Posner’s account,112 the backward-looking value in this account
is of intrinsic value. Thus, by placing liability on parties that act “selfishly,”
tort law would simultaneously be intrinsically backward-looking and
forward-looking.
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It is also important to note the following brief clarification regarding the
efficiency account: At first glance it might seem as though a judge trying to
determine whether a litigant has violated justice-as-efficiency (and thus has
acted tortiously) is carrying out the same process that a judge would have
carried out if his job were to bring about the best result according to the
forward-looking aspect of the government or legal system as a whole—
discussed at length in Part III.B. Despite the similarity between these two
potential tasks for a judge, however, they are importantly distinct. While
both tasks involve efficiency analyses, these analyses are of a different
nature. In the case in question in this section, where a judge is determining
whether a litigant has violated justice-as-efficiency, the analysis is simply an
investigation into whether or not the defendant acted efficiently by
performing (or failing to perform) the act in question. The other analysis—
where the judge’s task is to further the forward-looking aspect not of the law
itself, but of the government or legal system as a whole—would involve the
judge asking simply whether holding the defendant in the case at bar liable
would be an efficient action. Part of this analysis might be a function of the
analysis of whether the defendant acted efficiently, but this need not
necessarily be the case, and even if this were relevant, there might be many
other questions, inquiries, and factors that would be relevant to the decision
of whether the action of the court holding the defendant liable would be an
efficient one.
Clarification aside, and now returning to the justice-as-efficiency account
itself, the following is an objection that might be raised to the alleged
convergence between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of
tort law in the context of efficiency: One might say that while perhaps party
X is the cheapest cost-avoider in a particular instance, and X should be liable
on a forward-looking account, if X is complying with the law, then X would
not be liable on a backward-looking account. This objection fails, though,
because on the efficiency account, the fact that X is the cheapest cost-avoider
means that X is in violation of justice-as-efficiency, and thus, X has engaged
in wrongful conduct. While this objection does not point to a difficulty with
the backward-looking / forward-looking convergence, what it does show is
that there might be reasons why we (and even some self-proclaimed
advocates of justice-as-efficiency) perhaps should not endorse efficiency
violations as the substantive notion of wrongful conduct. This issue will be
discussed at length in Part IV.B.
2. The murky corrective-justice-based substantive account
An analogous account seemingly can be given of the convergence of
forward-looking and backward-looking tort law in a framework where
society’s goal is to minimize the amount of some other notion of “wrongful
conduct” that a corrective justice theorist might endorse. Whatever our
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substantive notion of wrongful conduct might be, it seems as though holding
people liable for conduct of this sort (and thus, bringing about backwardlooking intrinsic value) would also be the way to best deter future wrongful
conduct (and thus, bring about forward-looking intrinsic value).
One might think, however, that there would be a divergence between the
forward-looking and backward-looking approaches to the extent that holding
people liable also for conduct that is only marginally non-wrongful would
result in fewer wrongful acts going forward (because people would take extra
care not to act wrongfully). The thought here would be that there would be
some types of conduct that are barely on the non-wrongful side of the divide
that should not result in liability on a backward-looking account, but that
should on a forward-looking account. This, however, is mistaken, and for
the following reason: The more accurate way to describe the backwardlooking goal here is not merely to bring about redress for wrongful harms,
but rather, to bring about redress for wrongful harms and to not bring about
redress for conduct that does not constitute a wrongful harm. Thus,
similarly, the forward-looking goal here would be not merely to deter
wrongful harms, but both to deter wrongful harms and to not deter conduct
that does not constitute a wrongful harm.
Thus, in light of this
clarification113 , it seems as though tailoring the liability-non-liability point to
the wrongful-non-wrongful point would not only best achieve the two
components of the backward-looking goal, but it would also seem to best
achieve the two components of the forward-looking goal.
As was the case with the efficiency framework, it seems as though this
more murky “wrongful conduct” framework is not immediately implausible.
As was the case with the efficiency framework, it seems that whatever the
overarching value adhered to by the individuals in this framework is, it likely
is the cause of both the corresponding forward-looking intuition and the
corresponding backward-looking intuition. Furthermore, though this section
has just canvased two possible frameworks, it seems that the reasoning here
could be expanded to other substantive notions of wrongful conduct and
substantive notions of society’s forward-looking goals. Thus, there is reason
to think that if we hold fixed the substantive notion of wrongness and societal
goals, the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts would yield the
same prescriptions of liability and non-liability in all possible cases.
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D. Implications
1. The “fundamental principle” debate
If it is in fact the case that, holding an account of wrongful conduct
constant, a forward-looking account’s prescriptions will be coextensive with
the prescriptions of a backward-looking account, this is an important
revelation. Further, it’s important to realize that this claim is very different
from Posner’s claim, discussed in Part II. Posner only attempts to show that
the economic theory of tort law is compatible with the Aristotelian notion of
corrective justice.114 Posner makes it very clear that the reason why the
economic theory of tort is compatible with Aristotle’s account of corrective
justice is that Aristotle does not give a rationale for the duty of corrective
justice—the Aristotelian account is non-committal about whether corrective
justice is an intrinsic good or a mere instrumental good.115 This opens up
room for Posner’s claim, because Posner thinks that corrective justice is
merely good to the extent that it maximizes economic efficiency going
forward.116 Not only is Posner only claiming that the economic theory of tort
is compatible with the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, but he is
explicitly pessimistic about the economic theory of tort being compatible
with what he takes to be the current corrective justice theorists’ positions.117
Posner could and should have gone further. There is no reason why tort
cannot be intrinsically backward-looking and intrinsically forward-looking.
It could well be, however, that corrective justice theorists and economic
theorists would still diverge in their views about what constitutes wrongful
conduct. Nevertheless, Posner still stops a step too short, because on the
most hotly contested issue in the debate, the two views are in fact
compatible.
If it were not the case that forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts of tort were coextensive, debates about the “fundamental,” “core,”
or “sovereign”118 principles of tort law would have great interest.
Furthermore, the fact that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts
would have some overlapping prescriptions would explain why terms such as
“fundamental” are used. For example, a corrective justice theorist might
acknowledge that in some cases his theory would have the collateral benefit
of bringing about good forward-looking results, yet still be able to say that
corrective justice or a backward-looking principle is the fundamental
principle of tort law. In other words, he would be saying that when there is a
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conflict between theories, we know that it is corrective justice’s prescription
that is the one we should follow.
Even if the convergence thesis is true, though, this does not mean that
there is no logical space for a debate about the “fundamental” principle of
tort law to continue. The camps might continue to argue that it is their
principle that is fundamental, and that it is a contingent fact that the two
accounts provide coextensive prescriptions. (Interestingly, it seems as though
much of the current debate about the “fundamental” principle might fit into
the category of this paragraph. Current use of the term “fundamental
principle” is frequently aimed at cases of obvious convergence.119 It might
even be the minority of cases where the term is employed to point to the
appropriate principle to guide prescriptions in cases of divergence.) It seems
as though this type of a debate is and would be misguided, however. It’s not
clear what it would even mean, in this context, to say that corrective justice,
for example, is the fundamental principle of tort law. Perhaps one way to
understand the claim would be as a claim about the intention of the framers
of tort law. If so, this inquiry would be akin to, and would be confronted
with many of the difficulties associated with, statutory interpretation. Tort
law has gradually been formed by numerous judicial decisions and it would
be impossible to attribute a single intention to the numerous contributors.120
Furthermore, even in particular cases, panels of judges often reach a majority
despite there being no consensus as to the rationale for the decision. Thus, it
seems fruitless to attack the issue in this way. Alternatively, one might think
that the fundamental principle of tort law would mean “the most important
aspect of tort law,” or something to this effect. But we already know there is
no shortage of debate about this. Thus, while we could still debate what
constitutes the fundamental principle of tort law even if the various principles
converge in what they prescribe, for a debate of this sort to be fruitful, the
first step should involve explaining precisely what is meant by
“fundamental.” Without requiring a clear understanding of this, various
camps are likely to talk past one another.
2. Summary
While this Article has argued that a forward-looking account of tort is
compatible with a backward-looking account of tort, what this means for the
debate between corrective justice theorists and economic theorists depends
on a few things. For one, it depends on how they describe their positions. If
the economic account is understood as holding that “the only intrinsic goal of
tort law is forward-looking” and the corrective justice account is understood
as holding that “the only intrinsic goal of tort law is backward-looking,” then
it seems that both accounts are false. If, however the economic account is
119
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understood as holding that “tort law always has an intrinsic forward-looking
goal” and the corrective justice account is understood as holding “tort law
always has an intrinsic backward-looking goal,” then it seems that both
accounts are correct, and that they are compatible.
Even if this is the case, there might still be disagreement between
economists and corrective justice theorists (if we still want to use these
labels) about what is or should be the substantive notion of wrongfulness or
the substantive notion of society’s forward-looking goals. As is, economists
argue for an efficiency-based notion, whereas corrective justice theorists
espouse something less precisely defined, but something that is, at least
prima facie, distinct from efficiency. Determining what this substantive
notion is or should be is no simple question, and it is this all-important
question that has been partially obscured by the debate about whether tort
law’s fundamental principle is forward-looking or backward-looking.
While perhaps there would still be vigorous debate between what we
might still refer to as economists and corrective justice theorists, the
disagreement within the two camps might be just as great as the
disagreement between the camps. While Posner originally articulated a
purely economic account, he has since espoused a more broadly welfarebased approach.121 Further, welfare-based approaches can be cashed out in
numerous ways. Corrective justice theorists, on the other hand, are also
capable of articulating a number of extremely different accounts of what
wrongful behavior consists in. Not only might the disagreement within
camps be as great as the disagreement between them, but it is likely that in
some cases, some so-called economic views will resemble some so-called
corrective justice views more than they resemble other views under the
economic umbrella.
Thus, going forward, it is important that we not let ourselves get drawn
in to the debate between corrective justice theorists and economic theorists
about whether tort law is forward-looking or backward-looking. Instead of
being led astray in this way, we must keep our focus on the real question—
how we should understand the substantive notion of wrongful conduct and
the substantive notion of society’s forward-looking goals.122 Hopefully, now
121

See Posner, supra note 17.
While this question has been partially obscured by the focus on the forwardlooking / backward-looking debate, it is certainly not the case that the question of the
substantive notion of wrongful conduct and or the substantive notion of societal
goals has not been distinguished from other issues and addressed explicitly on its
own. For example, Dworkin famously challenges Posner regarding his original view
that tort law’s goal is to maximize wealth: Dworkin argues that, even if one thinks
that tort law is in the business of maximizing something, it’s crazy to think that
wealth maximization, as distinct from happiness or something else that has clear
value, should be what tort law is about. See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
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armed with greater clarity, we will be better equipped to make progress on
this important issue.
IV. IDENTIFYING A PLAUSIBLE SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT
If the above reasoning is correct and the backward-looking and forwardlooking accounts would be coextensive in their prescriptions if the
substantive notion of wrongness and societal goals were held fixed, what this
shows is that backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of tort are
theoretically compatible. This has widely been denied in the literature, and
thus constitutes an important realization in and of itself. Nevertheless, even
if this theoretical compatibility claim is true, it could be the case, as a
practical matter, that people—be they self-proclaimed corrective justice
theorists, economists, or others—do not, as a matter of fact, subscribe to the
same substantive views for both the forward-looking and backward-looking
aspects of tort law. If this were the case, and an individual had two different
substantive views for the two different aspects of tort, this would suggest that
tort law would not simultaneously be able to fully coincide with such an
individual’s forward-looking and backward-looking views.123 For such a
person, then, it would seem as though a question would arise as to whether
tort law should be an institution that seeks to further forward-looking value
or backward-looking value, or some mix of the two. Thus, the question that
confronts us at this point is whether, as a practical fact, our substantive
notion of wrongfulness lines up with our substantive notion of societal goals.
This Part will consider in further depth the two most salient and plausible
candidates for the substantive notions—the murky rights-based corrective
justice notion and the efficiency notion—and it will explore whether it is
plausible to maintain either of them as the substantive notion for both
components of one’s forward-looking / backward-looking view pair. It will
consider various interesting sub-issues, but the conclusion will be that it
currently does not seem to be plausible to hold either of the two substantive
notions for both one’s forward-looking and backward-looking view. The
murky corrective justice substantive notion does not provide a plausible
forward-looking view, yet the efficiency substantive notion does not provide
a plausible backward-looking view.
Given this finding, Part V will proceed by showing that this practical
divergence turns out to be much smaller than one might think, and it is thus
still the case that we do have almost complete practical convergence. This
notwithstanding, it discusses what the implications of the divergences that do
exist are for the well-being of our society. It then considers approaches that
123

Unless, by some very odd coincidence, the liability regime prescribed by the
person’s backward-looking account would actually be the regime that would best
maximize his account of our societal goals—despite the difference between the two
substantive notions themselves.
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can be taken to eliminate the divergence and bring about not only theoretical
compatibility but also practical compatibility between forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of tort. The Article will argue that this is in fact
a possibility and it will offer some practical proposals for how to carry out a
transformation project of this sort.
A last note before proceeding: The theoretical compatibility claim itself
thus turns out to be of both instrumental and intrinsic value. The
instrumental importance: If it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of bringing
about the practical convergence that the Article proposes wouldn’t even
exist. This convergence would be valuable—and thus it is of instrumental
value. The intrinsic importance: Even if the above-mentioned practical
convergence were not possible, it is an important revelation that the forwardlooking and backward-looking aspects of tort are theoretically compatible,
because it shows that authors have been mistaken about what precisely is at
issue in the debate and that authors have been mistaken about where the
action lies in tort law and about what underlies different views. As such, this
discovery will bring about substantially greater clarity.
And now we turn to the exploration of whether it is plausible to maintain
an efficiency or a murky corrective justice substantive notion for both
components of one’s forward-looking / backward-looking view pair.
A. The Murky Corrective-Justice-Based Substantive Account
Ultimately, this section will argue that it is not plausible to hold (and that
we do not hold) the murky corrective justice substantive notion for both the
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law. First, however,
this Part will consider and reject a common reason—offered by nonconsequentialists—for believing that we do not hold this substantive
forward-looking / backward-looking pair. After explaining the nonconsequentialist’s claim, it will argue that it is mistaken for two reasons:
First, it is based on a contradictory and implausible account of value.
Second, even if the non-consequentialist account were plausible, it still
wouldn’t show that it’s incoherent, problematic, or implausible to hold the
murky corrective justice substantive notion for both the forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of tort law. After showing why the nonconsequentialist’s argument fails, the Article will then provide its own,
different, explanation for why it is not plausible to hold the murky corrective
justice substantive notion for both the forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts of tort.
1. The first difficulty for non-consequentialist arguments
Let’s consider one position often articulated by corrective justice
theorists. Suppose one’s backward-looking substantive view of wrongful
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conduct is the murky, somewhat undefined, but allegedly intuitively
understood notion of wrongful conduct articulated by many corrective justice
theorists. Taking this as the substantive notion of wrongful conduct, the
complementary substantive notion of societal goals, as discussed above,
would seemingly be to minimize the number of (and severity of) occurrences
of wrongful conduct (and maximize the occurrence of non-wrongful conduct)
in the future. Theorists who maintain the backward-looking view just
mentioned, however, will often deny this complementary forward-looking
view, and they do this for the following reason: It is often objected to their
view that if, in fact, corrective justice is valuable, this is because of the fact
that it is bad for there to be wrongs that go without redress, and, if this were
the case, it certainly would be the case that it would be good to actively
choose to not carry out corrective justice for a person whose right has been
violated if this will have the forward-looking effect of preventing, say, five
future rights violations of the same type.124 This, however, is not something
that these corrective justice theorists want to accept. In support of their
intuition that it would not be acceptable to sacrifice one person’s rights in
order to prevent more numerous future rights violations, the corrective justice
theorist will offer a scapegoating example of the sort described above, in
Parts II.B and III.B.
According to corrective justice theorists in this camp, this forwardlooking view that is allegedly the complement of their backward-looking
view is not acceptable because, they say, it would erode their backwardlooking view of rights and corrective justice.125 The result of maintaining the
forward-looking view of minimizing rights violations would give rise to, in
the words of Robert Nozick, a “utilitarianism of rights.”126 In other words,
one person’s rights could be traded off against the rights of others, and these
utilitarian-style tradeoffs and aggregations would defeat the very purpose of
a right and render rights non-existent—or at least render the notion of rights
self-contradictory.
Some authors have argued that possible theories
consistent with this account—one of which is Amartya Sen’s theory of “goal
rights”127—would be a plausible middle ground between utilitarian theories
and traditional rights theories, but, as many theorists have argued, and
successfully so, the prospects for articulating plausible foundations for
accounts of this sort are doubtful at best.
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There are a variety of similar views, some of which are more nuanced than
others. For further discussion of these issues, and views of this sort, see for example
F.M. Kamm, Harming Some to Save Others, 57 PHIL. STUD.: AN INT’L J. FOR PHIL.
IN THE ANALYTIC TRADITION 227–60 (1989); Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley
Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395–1415 (1985).
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See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6.
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ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28 (1974).
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Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. AND PUB. AFFAIRS. 3 (1982).
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Thus, these corrective justice theorists who are committed to redressing
rights violations and who deny the forward-looking complement to their
view will be proponents of non-consequentialist moral theories—theories for
which factors related to consequences of an action might be relevant to the
permissibility of an action but for which factors unrelated to consequences
can be relevant as well. A non-consequentialist seemingly would have two
options. First, he might adopt the “side-constraint”128 view, according to
which one should strive to bring about the best results, but one’s permissible
actions are limited by side-constraints—among them, for example, the
constraint that one not violate a person’s right, even if doing so would lead to
fewer rights violations of the same type in the future. Despite the fact that
this view has many adherents, it is rife with difficulties in handling
objections, and thus it is difficult to take this type of view seriously. For
example, what could possibly ground a non-consequentialist’s belief that it is
valuable to redress one instance of a rights violation that is unopposed, but
not think that it is good to violate one person’s right to prevent five, one
hundred, or two million rights violations that would otherwise occur? Side
constraints on action are not plausible absent instrumental benefits that they
bring about, but if there are instrumental benefits, then the justification of the
side constraints resides elsewhere and something else is doing the moral
work.
A second option for the non-consequentialist is to not adopt side
constraints, but rather to adopt the more extreme view that consequences are
not just one factor among many relevant to assessing the goodness of an act,
but rather, that they are not at all relevant to determining the goodness of an
act. This view is even more implausible, though, both because of the
difficulty in denying consequences any value at all and because of the
difficulty in explaining, in a framework of this sort, how we do know which
actions are good, and what it is that makes these actions good if not their
consequences.
Furthermore, despite the serious contradictions and objections that
plague non-consequentialist accounts in the moral sphere, they are even less
plausible in the legal sphere—including in tort law—where policies are more
easily seen in terms merely of their consequences and where the actor in
question is not an individual agent, but, rather, the state. The law exists, in
large part, because we are unable to rely on agents to always do what is
moral or what will lead to the best result, and thus, the law is an institution
that uses its machinery to bring about certain results. Further, the law has to
balance various practical concerns, and there is good reason, for example,
and despite Seana Shiffrin’s pleas to the contrary, for specific performance
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not to be the default remedy for contract breach, and for other alleged
divergences law and morality.129
Ultimately, there will be parties who staunchly cling to their nonconsequentialist views and there will be an impasse that arises in the debate.
The non-consequentialist will continue to deny the forward-looking view that
corresponds to his backward-looking view, and thus he will likely not get on
board with the bulk of the claims made in this Article. Little more can be
said here and it will be left for the reader to judge. The points made here,
however, aim to show that the non-consequentialist does not have a coherent
account of what has intrinsic value.
2. The second difficulty for non-consequentialist arguments
As mentioned above, the non-consequentialist corrective justice theorist
rejects the forward-looking substantive complement to his backward-looking
view (in part) on the basis that it is inconsistent with his backward-looking
notion of rights. Importantly, however, this forward-looking view will only
be inconsistent with this theorist’s backward-looking rights view if there are
cases where the two diverge. What this theorist is concerned about is the
possibility that the forward-looking view would prescribe a decision
violating one person’s right in order to prevent more numerous future rights
violations. This, however, would not be a problem if it were the case that
there never were any cases where the backward-looking view and its
forward-looking complement had different prescriptions. Furthermore, this
is precisely what this Article has argued is the case. As argued in the prior
section, why should we believe that there would in fact be any cases where
the backward-looking view’s prescription would bring about anything but the
incentives associated with minimizing rights violations in the future as well?
The common example given to support this point is the scapegoat example,
which, to repeat, states: “Deterring cheapest cost-avoiders from committing
future harms is no more imposing justified liability in tort than hanging the
innocent to deter future crimes is imposing justified criminal punishment.”130
As discussed in Part III.B, despite its vividness in conveying the
unattractiveness of scapegoating, the example of an innocent man being
hanged to deter future crime131 is not an instance of divergence between the
law’s backward-looking prescriptions and its forward-looking prescriptions.
The scapegoating example addresses a related, but different, question:
129

See Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contact and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708 (2007). Contra Barbara Fried, What’s Morality Got to Do With It?, 120
HARV. L. REV. 53 (2007) (offering a direct response in this reply piece to Shiffrin’s
article).
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Keating, supra note 3, at 10.
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This example is attributable to Keating, Rawls, and countless others. See
supra Part I.B.
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Should the judicial system’s actions on the whole be forward-looking? The
scapegoating case is not an instance of the criminal law adhering to forwardlooking prescriptions. The judicial system is not declaring that an act is
illegal if it leads to worse welfare for future members of society. In fact, the
judicial system in the scapegoating case is not declaring anything at all that
the scapegoat has done to be illegal. The system is merely making people
believe that a particular act—that was and is illegal—was in fact committed.
While this question of whether a judicial system’s actions on the whole
should be forward-looking is related to the question of whether the law itself
should be forward-looking, as discussed in Part III.B, the two are importantly
distinct. Thus, the key point here is that it is not obvious that there would be
any cases where the law itself would further the backward-looking murky
corrective justice notion of wrongful conduct while not also furthering its
forward-looking complement—of minimizing future occurrences of
wrongful conduct—and vice versa. Further, as already discussed,132 there are
positive reasons to believe that the two might always either both obtain or
both not obtain but never be the case that one obtains while the other does
not.
If these points are correct, this corrective justice theorist with nonconsequentialist leanings or allegiances might still maintain that it is only the
backward-looking aspect of tort law that has intrinsic value. He might
maintain that tort still is not intrinsically forward-looking, either because the
forward-looking result is a mere collateral benefit, or because it is irrelevant
to tort, and thus not even a benefit at all. If this is the position taken, it seems
that we can at least hang our hat on the fact that the forward-looking aspect
of tort would be coextensive with the backward-looking aspect, even if it is
denied that the forward-looking aspect is of intrinsic value. Further, as
discussed in the prior section, there are reasons to have strong doubts about
whether this theorist could coherently and plausibly maintain the backwardlooking value that he posits without finding this forward-looking result to be
intrinsically valuable.
3. Why the murky corrective-justice-based account nevertheless fails
It has been argued, here in Part IV.A, that the non-consequentialist
arguments given above do not successfully give us reason to doubt the claim
that the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are both
of intrinsic value and that the substantive account of each is the murky
corrective justice notion. This notwithstanding, a different reason can be
given for why this backward-looking / forward-looking pair of substantive
views is not plausible—and this is the case even if one leaves aside the
consequentialist / non-consequentialist debate. The reason is as follows:
132
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Although the murky corrective justice notion of wrongful conduct might be
plausible, it seems that the murky corrective justice notion does not provide a
plausible substantive notion of forward-looking societal goals.
It seems that our substantive notion of forward-looking value must either
be happiness or some complex good of which happiness is an important
component. Despite the importance of minimizing rights violations, this
does not seem to be something that has intrinsic value for us. All else equal,
it certainly seems to be a good thing to minimize rights violations (however
we want to specify this term’s meaning), but it seems to be only one
component of good state of affairs in the future—and thus, one that could be
outweighed by combinations of various other factors, including but not
limited to happiness, or perhaps equality, or some broader scale values.133 It
isn’t difficult to think of possible pairs of future states of affairs, one of
which is comprised of people who are miserable but includes no rights
violations, and the other which is a much happier state of affairs—even a
pareto improvement,134 and perhaps there is also greater equality between
welfare and resources of different individuals in society—but where there are
some, if not many, “rights violations.” In such a case we would surely prefer
the second society despite it giving rise to rights violations. As such, it
cannot be that minimizing rights violations is a plausible substantive account
of our forward-looking societal goals. Interestingly, this same concern will
arise below, in Part V, with regard to other attempts to articulate substantive
accounts of a forward goal that are anything other than the maximization of
happiness—even if they are described in utilitarian-based or efficiency-based
terms.
One might, however, object to the idea that the rights-based substantive
notion of wrongful conduct / societal goals actually is plausible, even if all of
the above comments are correct. How could this be? One might say that this
is because the forward-looking rights based societal goal, as a matter of fact,
would perfectly track, say, the forward-looking happiness-based efficiency
goal, and if these two did not diverge from one another, then the current
account would in fact be plausible. This is a reasonable point to make, but,
as the next section explains, the forward-looking happiness goal and the
forward-looking rights minimization goal would not in fact be coextensive.
133

Various accounts of “broader scale values” have been articulated in the
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single person is worse off in s1 than in s2.
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B. The Efficiency-Based Substantive Account
It has been argued that, if we hold the substantive notions of wrongful
conduct / societal goals fixed, forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts would be coextensive. The next question was whether, in light of
this, there were in fact any substantive notions for which the forward-looking
/ backward-looking pair would accurately depict our actual views, and
whether the pair would be generally plausible. It was argued above135 that
the murky corrective justice notion of substantive wrongful conduct would
not fit the bill, because, while it might accurately characterize our backwardlooking value, it does not accurately characterize our forward-looking value
or a forward-looking value that we might plausibly or reasonably endorse.
The question now is whether a happiness-based efficiency view would be a
substantive notion that could be plausible for both the forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects. This section argues that this substantive notion
does not fit the bill either, because while it might accurately characterize our
forward-looking value, it does not accurately characterize our backwardlooking value.
1. What an efficiency-based substantive account would look like
As argued in the prior section, in explaining the murky corrective justice
substantive notion’s failure to satisfactorily depict our forward-looking view,
it seems that what a forward-looking view of tort law should take as a
societal goal is happiness-based efficiency—i.e., striving to maximize future
happiness. Of course, this can be quantified in various ways and there might
be both factual and various types of theoretical disagreement about how to
further this goal. This notwithstanding, it seems hard to argue with the claim
that the law’s forward-looking goal should be to maximize happiness.
What would a law that strives to maximize happiness going forward look
like? As discussed earlier, it would take an approach analogous to the
approach that the murky corrective justice theory’s substantive notion would
take:136 It would pin liability on parties for taking actions that violate the
substantive notion of wrongful conduct, and in this case that will mean
liability will be pinned on individuals who “act selfishly” by not taking the
interest of others sufficiently into account, or more precisely, it will be
pinned on individuals who take actions that lead to net disutility. The
thought is this will force parties to internalize the externalities that they
would otherwise impose, and thus incentivize them to act efficiently.137
135

See supra Part IV.A.
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Learned Hand’s famous formula (“The Hand Theorem”). See United States v.
136

2016

TORT LAW

89

But what, precisely, will be the letter of the law? In the case of the
murky corrective justice notion of wrongs, the idea seemed to be that liability
would exist for the violation of certain “rights.” These rights could be
written into the law (be it in statutes or even in common law opinions) in
various ways and with the possibility of varying levels of abstractions.
Rights could be as specific as “It is one’s right to not have one’s car
vandalized in one’s driveway” or as broad as “It is one’s right to not have
one’s property interfered with.” In the case of the happiness-based efficiency
standard, though, there simply is no rule other than “Do what is most
efficient.” People certainly might adopt rules of thumb in determining how
to act—e.g., “Torturing someone generally is an inefficient activity”—just as
act utilitarian’s138 will often have rules of thumb that they use (be it
consciously or unconsciously) in determining whether an action is right or
wrong.139 Similarly, courts might have rules of thumb that they use to aid
their decisions in particular cases. As a result of this, the efficiency-based
law might appear to resemble a rights-based law. This notwithstanding,
however, the difference is great: On the rights-based law, the rights are not
mere rules of thumb, but they are determinative. On the efficiency-based
law, however, the law still remains “Do what is most efficient,” and thus a
full analysis of what was most efficient is required—i.e., the rules of thumb
are merely rules of thumb and are only meant to aid the analysis.140

Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand Theorem, however,
unlike the current standard, was generally formulated in monetary terms. While the
Hand Theorem is not used particularly frequently, it does show its face—at least
implicitly—from time to time.
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An act utilitarian is one who holds that the goodness of every single act is
determined by the amount of happiness it brings about, and the best act is the one
that brings about the most happiness.
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For a discussion of different approaches a utilitarian might take to “rules of
thumb,” see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861).
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It’s important to recall, throughout this discussion, the clarification made in
Part III.C: Even though judges in the system being described are performing
efficiency analyses, the analysis here is different from the analysis that would be
carried about by a judge whose job was to further the forward-looking aspect of the
government or legal system on the whole—as opposed to the judge’s job here in the
case being discussed, which is to hold a party liable for violating justice-asefficiency. In the case here, the judge’s inquiry is an efficiency analysis, but an
analysis into the efficiency of the defendant’s act in question. If the judge’s task
were to further the forward-looking aspect of the government or legal system on the
whole, the analysis would still be an efficiency analysis, but an analysis into whether
it would be an efficient act for the court to hold the defendant liable. This analysis
might involve, as a component, the analysis into the efficiency of the defendant’s act,
but it need not necessarily involve this. Further, even if it did involve this, many
other components might be involved as well.
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2. Objections to the forward-looking efficiency account
Various objections can be raised against the forward-looking aspect of
the efficiency account (before getting to the more serious objections that
afflict the backward-looking aspect of the efficiency account). For one, one
might worry that in some tort suits neither party has violated justice-asefficiency, and it is a third-party that is the cheapest cost-avoider (be it in
happiness terms, or, more tangibly in economic terms, where economic terms
are ultimately proxies for happiness). Perhaps a motorcycle manufacturer is
actually the cheapest cost-avoider of an accident, resulting in a suit between
the drivers of two vehicles that have collided. If so, this does not pose a
serious threat to the justice-as-efficiency account, because this third party
could have been sued. Further, even if a third party is the most egregious
violator of justice-as-efficiency, this does not mean that neither of the two
drivers has also violated justice-as-efficiency. This party who is a mild
violator could then choose to join the manufacturer to the suit.
Other interesting questions and potential objections to the justice-asefficiency account arise in the context of collective action problems.
Consider, for example, a typical case of a collective action problem:
overfishing in the commons. Suppose that a society will be better off if the
commons is not overfished because this will allow the fish species (in the
relevant location) to reproduce enough to prevent the species from dying out,
and this in turn will benefit the society by enabling them to continue to enjoy
the fish for years to come. This notwithstanding, suppose that the choice of
any one fisherman to go fishing on a particular day to provide his family and
friends141 with fish will be an efficient one, because it will bring about great
benefit to them and this action alone will not have large enough
consequences to have any effect on whether the species dies out. The
concern here is that, if the facts are as stipulated, justice-as-efficiency will
hold that there should be no liability triggered by the fisherman going
fishing, and further, it would be tortious for him not to go fishing. This
might be concerning because the most efficient result would actually be
brought about if no one goes fishing (or at least for the time-being, while the
fish population is regrown), and a component of this course of action is this
fisherman not going fishing. In other words, he would be held liable for
carrying out a necessary component of the most efficient outcome and he
would be non-liable if he fails to do so.
Though seemingly problematic, however, justice-as-efficiency gets the
right results. Nothing in the justice-as-efficiency account is incompatible
with there also being other laws—be they statutory or non-statutory—that
141
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trip will be his friends and family, but not himself. This simplifies matters because
cases where a party acts inefficiently, but where the harm caused is solely to oneself,
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2016

TORT LAW

91

govern behavior. Thus, what is required in the case of collective action
problems often is a blanket rule that does not leave room for weighing costs
and benefits on a case-by-case basis. It’s true that a (non-tort) law that
outlaws the relevant amount of fishing will likely not change the fact that it
would be efficient in the above cases to fish, but it could be that this statute
would preempt tort law in matters it governs. Regardless of how these
details are worked out, however, the important point here is that issues raised
by collective action problems are broad and wide-ranging, and they do not
uniquely pose difficulties and interesting issues for the justice-as-efficiency
account. Similar issues afflict other accounts, and thus, the collective action
issue is somewhat orthogonal to that of justice-as-efficiency.
This
notwithstanding, it is an important topic that merits considerable further
exploration.
Although numerous details regarding the forward-looking aspect of the
efficiency account still need to be worked out, the general framework seems
to make some sense. The difficulties arise when we look at the plausibility
of the backward-looking account that takes the substantive notion of
wrongful behavior to be behavior that is inefficient with respect to happiness.
It seems as though the backward-looking aspect of justice-as-efficiency, in
many ways, does not accurately depict our moral intuitions. And, to clarify,
if the backward-looking aspect of wrongful conduct does not match our
intuitions about wrongful conduct, this shows that a tort law regime of this
sort would have backward-looking disvalue. In other words, the net result in
happiness for society as a whole (including the litigants and third parties)
that is derived not from incentive effects brought about the decision, but
rather by sentiments regarding the appropriateness of the judgment in the
case at hand would be negative.
3. An objection to the backward-looking efficiency account
It is worth first mentioning one concern that one might have, but which is
not as problematic as it appears. One might say that the backward-looking
aspect of justice-as-efficiency fails to match our moral intuition about what
constitutes wrongful conduct for the following reason: The justice-asefficiency standard would render a party liable for bringing about a
suboptimal result in terms of happiness, but our moral intuitions regarding
wrongfulness and blame generally incorporate a mental state requirement of
some sort—be it intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, depending
on the facts, and possibly a sliding scale consisting of each of these states to
different degrees. If so, one might thus think that the divergence between
one’s moral intuition and justice-as-efficiency tort liability would occur both
when one has reason to think that one’s action (or omission) has expected
harm but where no harm results, and, similarly, when one has reason to think
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that one’s action (or omission) has no expected harm, but where harm does in
fact result.
Despite its appearances, however, this objection is easily handled. First,
in describing the forward-looking aspect of justice-as-efficiency, it was
ambiguous to refer to liability-triggering actions as ones that are inefficient.
More precisely, an inefficient action, for our purposes, should be defined not
as one that leads to a suboptimal result, but one for which the expected
results, given the party’s knowledge, were suboptimal. In fact, in most cases,
it is this definition—and not the one regarding actual results—that will be
what actually operates on people’s incentives and affects their actions in the
shadow of the law, thus effectively carrying out the forward-looking societal
goal. Thus, this takes care of the second of the two alleged types of cases of
divergence. The case where an agent acts with the belief that there is
expected harm, but where he gets lucky and no harm results is a more
complicated case, and here there does seem to be a divergence. It is a fact
about tort law, however, as opposed to criminal law, that a case requires
actual harm on the part of the plaintiff, and thus tort law is about the losses to
plaintiffs rather than gains to tortfeasors (defined in one way or another,
including acting in a risky manner and thus avoiding the cost of precautions).
Whether this aspect of tort law is defensible and desirable is an important
question, but one that is a topic for another article and which need not (and,
cannot, in light of space limitations) concern us here. It need not concern us
here because this issue does not uniquely affect this discussion regarding tort
law. All discussions of the backward-looking aspect of tort law focus on
cases where a party suffers harm.
The first prong of the two general concerns above was that a backwardlooking justice-as-efficiency account, if it has any hope of matching our
intuitions, must have a mental-state requirement of some sort, and it seemed
as though the forward-looking aspect might not. This objection was handled
by pointing out that the forward-looking account would include a mentalstate requirement and focus on expected results. This also handles a specific
instance of this general objection that is worth mentioning—both because it
raises interesting issues and because it could have been raised as a concern
not only about the compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts, but about the plausibility and workability of a forward-looking
justice-as-efficiency account even on its own, leaving aside compatibility
concerns. The concern is as follows: If the forward-looking aspect focused
only on results and not on expected results, it isn’t clear what would qualify
as the optimal result, because it wouldn’t be clear what the relevant options
to assess would be. There are an infinite number of possible actions that
could be taken at any point, and with an infinite number of (unpredictable
and remote) results.142 It would be unclear how the relevant possible actions
142
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and results could be constrained. In most cases we would not want to hold a
party liable for failing to think of a better idea. We wouldn’t think a
motorcycle manufacturer should be held liable for failing to invent a tire that
doesn’t skid, or—even more extreme—for discovering a new truth about
quantum mechanics that would have enabled him to design such a tire.
Further, there is no such thing as one best idea; one could always conceive of
one that would yield even better results. Without some sort of mental state
requirement, it’s unclear that a non-arbitrary constraint of the relevant
options, actions, and results could be articulated.
Thus, by including a mental state-requirement and focusing on expected
results, we avoid the above concerns about a forward-looking efficiencybased account (problems that would exist even leaving aside compatibility
concerns). And, more generally, we at least give the efficiency-based
substantive account a fighting chance of compatibility, because not only is
the forward-looking account now workable, but it matches the backwardlooking account by including a mental-state requirement, and thus avoids one
potential divergence. As a practical matter, however, a forward-looking
expected value efficiency-based account would give rise to some potential
concerns. For one, there would be many tricky evidentiary issues regarding
the proof of an alleged tortfeasor’s mental state—proving both what he took
to be the different possible actions available to him, and also what he took
the expected values of the different actions to be. These issues, however,
while interesting, do not really appear to be different in type from issues that
arise elsewhere in the law. Further, these issues might not differ in degree of
complexity or intractability either. As such, though these practical concerns
are important to note, they do not appear to be overly problematic.
As will be discussed below, however, we are still far from showing that
there is a plausible account of tort that takes happiness-based efficiency as its
substantive notion of wrongful conduct / societal goals for both the forwardlooking and backward-looking aspects.
4. Why the efficiency-based account fails
The real problem with the happiness-based efficiency account of tort
law, however, is that its backward-looking aspect does not seem to
sufficiently track our intuitions regarding wrongful conduct—even if it might
do so to some extent. The divergence here between general moral intuitions
and the backward-looking efficiency account corresponds directly to a cluster
of related objections that have famously been leveled against utilitarian
moral theorists. This should come as no surprise in light of the fact that
utilitarianism states that an agent is acting wrongfully if he does not do what
he believes will maximize happiness, and this is precisely what the
see James Lenman, Consequentialism and Cluelessness, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 342
(2000).
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backward-looking happiness-based efficiency account of tort law is stating as
well.143
The most famous of these objections is known as the “overdemandingness” objection, and it was introduced by Bernard Williams in
Utilitarianism: For and Against.144
According to this objection,
utilitarianism does not provide a plausible account of morality because it
requires too much of us.145 If every single dollar we have could bring more
happiness to the world if donated to charity than if we spent it on ourselves,
utilitarianism would say that it is immoral to spend a single dollar on oneself.
This, say the proponents of the objection, is far too demanding of a moral
standard.146 This is the crux of the objection, but it can be further described
and elaborated upon in at least two (related) ways: by appealing to negative
responsibility and by appealing to alienation.
According to Williams, part of what is problematic about the overdemandingness of utilitarianism is the fact that it imposes “negative
responsibility” on agents.147 According to Williams, utilitarianism goes
wrong by failing to take into account the consideration that “each of us is
specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people
do.”148 It would be the implication of utilitarianism that not only must one
behave appropriately generally within one’s own sphere, but that one must
do what one can to either prevent others from acting badly or to mitigate the
effects of the bad actions of others.149
This constitutes “negative
responsibility” because it is about preventing or minimizing the bad effects
of others’ actions as opposed to merely requiring that a person simply make
sure that he does not do something wrongly. This, Williams thinks, is too
intrusive, and it results in boundless obligation being imposed on agents.150
Secondly, and relatedly, the negative responsibility that utilitarianism
imposes on an agent is an attack on integrity, because it “alienate[s] him in a
real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own
convictions.”151 Williams thinks it is “absurd to demand” of a man that he
leave his own projects behind and that he do what a utilitarian calculus
requires: having one’s actions largely determined by the projects of others.152
According to Williams, this makes him simply a “janitor” of a system of
143
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values, and prevents him from basing his actions on his own decisions,
projects, and attitudes—in other words, utilitarianism alienates people from
themselves.153
There is also another problem that is raised for utilitarianism that is an
offshoot of the over-demandingness objection (though one that merits its
own mention): utilitarianism’s alleged inability to accommodate our
commonsense notion of supererogation. In his 1958 article, Saints and
Heroes, J.O. Urmson called our attention to the fact that the traditional
threefold classification of actions—duties, wrongs, and the permissible but
not morally required—is “totally inadequate to the facts of morality” because
of its inability to accommodate supererogatory acts.154 According to
Urmson, supererogatory acts are acts that go beyond what duty requires.155
As such, they are morally optional and it is not blameworthy to fail to
perform the act, yet at the same time, the performance of the act has moral
worth.156 According to Urmson, moral theories must be amended to allow
for the possibility of supererogatory acts.157 The problem, however, is that
utilitarianism (as compared to other moral theories) seems to have particular
difficulty accommodating supererogation.158
The difficulty that
utilitarianism has in accommodating supererogatory intuitions stems from the
same feature of utilitarianism that gives rise to the over-demandingness
objection to utilitarianism. According to classical utilitarianism, one is
acting wrongly unless one brings about the best possible result in utilitarian
terms.159 As such, if the duty utilitarianism imposes on agents is to bring
about the best possible result in utilitarian terms, it seems as though there is
no room for supererogatory actions—actions that go above and beyond duty.
The bar has already been set at the top. This, it seems, is problematic,
because people generally have the intuition that a class of supererogatory
actions does exist.
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Lastly, and related to but somewhat distinct from the various concerns
above, another concern that one might have about the ability of the
backward-looking justice-as-efficiency account to track our intuitions of
wrongful conduct is the fact that one might find legal or moral intervention in
certain areas of one’s life to be overly intrusive and inappropriate. In other
words, one might not only find it to be inappropriate for the law to meddle in
certain personal matters (even if one’s actions or one’s family or friends’
actions are inefficient), but one might even find it to be the case that there are
some domains where one does not think that morality should provide
judgments either.
Related to this, a concern that might arise is that there simply would be
too many tort claims if the legal standard were justice-as-efficiency. Almost
every single thing that one would do could likely be found tortious because
there would exist better alternatives that are available yet forgone. Some of
these alternatives could be significantly better than the chosen option, but in
the majority of cases there will be very little hedonic difference between
one’s action and the action that one inefficiently forwent. For example, we
wouldn’t want there to be a tort claim if a person eats a piece of candy rather
than offering it to his colleague or spouse who would derive more pleasure
from it than he would. These concerns, however, would not prove fatal to a
justice-as-efficiency legal standard. For one, it could be handled by the
equivalent of an “amount-in-controversy” requirement for suits to be
brought. Further, this likely would not even be necessary, because just as
does happen in our legal system today, people only go forward with litigation
if the expected benefit exceeds the expected attorneys fees and court fees that
one would incur if one brought a case to court. Thus, while interesting
questions would arise in connection with these issues,160 they do not amount
to serious problems for the justice-as-efficiency account—unlike the various
difficulties described earlier in this section, which most certainly do.
In sum, the problem with the justice-as-efficiency substantive account is
that its account of backward-looking value—i.e., wrongfulness equal to
violations of justice-as-efficiency—in general does not fully track our
intuitions. We generally think that there is a realm in which we are allowed
to act with our own best interests in mind even if other actions would bring
about greater happiness for the world on the whole. We do not think it is
160
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wrongful to allow ourselves to pursue our own goals with greater fervency
and give our own welfare—and that of our nearest and dearest—special
attention. Even an economist is likely to think that there is some realm of
“selfishness” that is not wrongful.
5. A different description of the efficiency account’s problem
There is one additional point worth discussing here with regard to the
backward-looking notion of justice-as-efficiency. As discussed at various
places earlier in this article, the backward-looking value is the value of
corrective justice.161 This backward-looking value is the value that is
brought about to litigants or to third parties due to sentiments regarding the
fairness or appropriateness of the court’s decision. This, in turn, is due to the
value that people attribute to averting a disturbance of—and, likewise,
bringing about a return to—the equilibrium dictated by distributive justice.
As discussed in Part I.B, the notion of corrective justice doesn’t necessitate
any particular theory of distributive justice, but it does rely on the fact that
there is a notion of distributive justice that renders the return to this
equilibrium, brought about by corrective justice, valuable.
When discussing the murkier intuitive substantive notion of corrective
justice, it didn’t seem particularly necessary to question what this predisturbance and post-redress distributive justice equilibrium amounted to,
because it seemed reasonable to assume that a plausible account of some sort
could be articulated if need be. Here, in the context of justice-as-efficiency
as the backward-looking substantive account, it seems to be more important
to indicate what such an equilibrium would amount to, because justice-asefficiency seems to suggest that the distributive justice equilibrium would
have to be quite different from typical accounts of distributive justice.
According to the justice-as-efficiency account, corrective justice is
required when a person does not do what he perceives to be the maximally
efficient action. Thus, it seems that the equilibrium that corrective justice
returns us to is not one where parties to the action are returned to a particular
level of resources or happiness where they were before the wrongful action
occurred. In many cases there seemingly would be a windfall gain for the
party upon whom some benefit could have been efficiently conferred, and a
windfall loss for the party that could have conferred the benefit.
Furthermore, it wouldn’t necessarily be the case that these unexpected gains
and losses would even out due to being “repeat players” in these situations of
life. It could well be the case that a particular individual would continue to
find himself in situations where he could, at large cost to himself, confer
efficient benefits on others, and similarly there could be another individual
who, by the luck of the draw, might repeatedly find himself in situations
161
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where he could efficiently have a benefit conferred upon him by someone
else. As such, one might say that this notion of corrective justice could add
great disturbances to an equilibrium defined in terms of resources or
happiness.
As a practical matter, though, these types of situations could potentially
be avoided, or at least minimized, by tweaking the way these suits work.
Perhaps it could be that a suit of this sort would not necessarily result in a
defendant losing the sum equivalent to the benefit that could have been
conferred on the other party, and perhaps the defendant wouldn’t even lose
the (lower) sum that he would have been required to expend to bring about
the efficient sacrifice. Perhaps some even lower sum could be the norm,
though this would seemingly fail to bring about the full internalization of
externalities—i.e., the appropriate forward-looking incentive effects.
Regardless of what the practical details would be, when conditions permit,
there would likely be considerable negotiation and contracting between
potential conferrers and conferees of benefits brought about by potentially
efficient sacrifices.162
These potential practical patches notwithstanding, the question still
remains what to make of the notion of the distributive justice equilibrium that
must lie beneath the justice-as-efficiency notion of corrective justice. This
will not be fleshed out in detail here, but it seems that the answer is that the
equilibrium would be one in which everyone is a steward of society’s best
interests on the whole, and that the more frequently and severely one fails to
carry out efficient actions, the greater one strays from one’s duties and the
further one departs from the equilibrium. This equilibrium is one in which
one simply carries out one’s stewardship and gets the luck of the draw in
terms of how many resources and how much happiness one accrues during
one’s lifetime. Though this notion of a distributive justice equilibrium is not
of the type one might tend to have in mind when thinking of a distributive
justice equilibrium in the background of corrective justice, it is not an
incoherent notion, and is not in and of itself a reason to reject justice-asefficiency. This notwithstanding, it might very well be that the fact that it
might strike many as counterintuitive is a direct result of the fact that justiceas-efficiency doesn’t track our notion of wrongful conduct—or, perhaps, vice
versa. If so, perhaps this inquiry into the distributive justice equilibrium is a
different, but equally good, way of addressing the question of whether
justice-as-efficiency tracks our intuitions about backward-looking value.
C. A Third Attempt to Identify a Plausible Substantive Account
As discussed, our backward-looking substantive notion of wrongful
conduct seems to be largely a murky corrective-justice-based substantive
162
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account whereas our forward-looking substantive account seems to be largely
efficiency-based.163 In our attempt to reconcile this apparent divergence, a
question naturally arises: Is it really not possible for utilitarianism to make
room for and accommodate supererogation? Despite the apparent difficulty,
due to the concerns raised in conjunction with the over-demandingness
objection to utilitarianism, perhaps utilitarianism can give an account of
supererogation.164 Further, one might think that perhaps an account of this
sort would be able to provide a single substantive account that we might be
able to adopt both as our backward-looking and forward-looking substantive
accounts. In what follows, this section will argue that utilitarianism can in
fact accommodate supererogation. It will argue, however, that this will not
rescue the current divergence between our substantive forward-looking view
and our substantive backward-looking view. This is because the utilitarian
account of supererogation, while either a decent description of the murky
backward-looking view in utilitarian terms, or while perhaps a description of
a related backward-looking view we might take, will not be able to capture
our intuitions as a plausible forward-looking view. Furthermore, this section
will argue that this is the case for the same reason that the murky backwardlooking view fails to provide a plausible forward-looking view—it would
take its goal as aiming to minimize “wrong actions” and this would often
come at the expense of maximizing happiness, which is what would be a
more plausible forward-looking societal goal.
This notwithstanding,
however, the utilitarian account of supererogation offered here is both
instructive in and of itself and in its failure to unite the two different
substantive views. Further, it will lay the foundations for the analysis in Part
V.
1. How utilitarianism might be able to accommodate supererogation
Recall that the challenge for utilitarianism in trying to accommodate
supererogation is that the bar has been already set at the top.165 According to
classical utilitarianism, one is acting wrongly unless one brings about the
best possible result in utilitarian terms.166 As such, it seems as though there
is no room for supererogatory actions—actions that go above and beyond
duty.
Despite the seeming incompatibility between utilitarianism and
supererogation, many philosophers do not want to give up either of the two
positions, and they thus seek ways in which to reconcile the two. At least
five proposals along these lines have been offered, which will be mentioned
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but not addressed in depth here: (1) Ties at the top,167 (2) Satisficing,168 (3)
Egoistically-adjusted utilitarianism,169 (4) Self-other utilitarianism,170 and (5)
Egoistic-adjustment self-other utilitarianism.171 While these proposals have
their merits, they are afflicted by two difficulties: First, and most
importantly, they exhibit great confusion regarding supererogation’s relation
to the notion of acting to maximize total utility of all (i.e., total utility of
everyone in the world), and its relation to the notion of acting to maximize
utility-for-others (i.e., total utility of all other than the agent).172 They
indicate that the notion of supererogation is a function of both, but they do
not offer plausible accounts of how these two inputs interact and why they
both are relevant to supererogation.173 (In other words, the question here is
as follows: Should a supererogatory act be defined in terms of how much
goodness it brings to the world, or in terms of how much goodness it brings
to individuals other than the agent, or in terms of some combination of the
two? There appear to be examples that provide intuitive support in favor and
against each of these three options.) Second, these views have difficulties in
defending the notion of a duty threshold—both in defending a particular nonarbitrary threshold and in defending the fact that there even exists such a
threshold.174 Thus, although these theories do contain important insights, a
new approach is needed if utilitarianism is to successfully accommodate
supererogation.175
Although the question of the duty threshold is not minor, the more
pressing problem is coming up with a coherent notion of the relationship
between supererogation and total utility and or utility-for-others. Once
sufficient progress is made here, the question of the duty threshold becomes
much easier to solve. Supererogation, however, seems to be based on the
notion of going beyond a particular threshold, and thus it might seem as
though it cannot be analyzed without the threshold already fixed. This
approach sketched here, however, proceeds in reverse, and begins by
analyzing what seems to be more basic than (and, in fact, one of the building
167
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blocks of) the notion of supererogation: moral praise and blame. In order to
avoid prejudging questions regarding duty thresholds, analysis of moral
praise and blame should take place within the framework of a scalar version
of utilitarianism that doesn’t specify any duties, but rather, merely compares
actions based on the goodness of the results they bring about.176
This analysis of praise and blame serves two purposes. First, it is a novel
theory of moral praise and blame that might be appealing to a utilitarian.
This, itself, will be an important achievement. Second, this analysis of moral
praise and blame will pave the way for a new account of supererogation.
According to the account of moral praise (and blame) introduced here,
we feel moral praise toward an agent neither because of the fact that he
brings about the best result, nor because of the fact that he performs an act
that he believes will bring about the best result. Our feelings of moral praise
have something to do with the notion of utility-for-others, but we don’t even
feel moral praise because of the fact that an agent does something he believes
will maximize utility-for-others. Rather, we feel moral praise toward an
agent when he performs an act that has a high value of utility-for-others, yet
also has a low value of utility for the agent himself, thus evidencing the fact
that the agent placed high weight on the outcome for those other than
himself. More specifically, what seems to be relevant is the percent weight
one mentally attributes to the expected results for oneself and the percent
weight one attributes to the expected results for others. The greater the
percent weight an agent attributes to the expected results for others, the more
positive (and less negative) the moral feeling is toward an agent for his act.
Thus, given an amount of suffering that an agent undergoes to bring about a
benefit to others, although it is commonly believed that the greater the
benefit (or expected benefit) that the agent brings about for others, the more
the agent is praised for his act, the theory offered here states the opposite,
and this seems to be a point in its favor.
Having suggested that the percent an agent weights the expected utilityfor-others is the only relevant value when it comes to moral assessment of
action, one option is for us to remain in a scalar framework and merely avail
ourselves of comparative claims when it comes to moral praise. While this
would not be a bad option, it seems that this approach would still not account
for our supererogatory intuitions. The question then becomes: Armed with
this single value, where should the duty threshold lie? A number of the
above accounts have suggested that if we opt against the merely scalar
176
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framework and seek a duty threshold, then it must be a fixed threshold on the
spectrum of the value(s) in question.177 However, any attempt made to
justify a particular point as a duty threshold is an utter failure, because no
non-arbitrary reasons are able to be provided for why this point is chosen.
These authors have mistakenly assumed that we have a choice merely
between the extremes of no duty threshold and a single fixed duty threshold.
More options exist: First of all, there is no need to precisely articulate a
particular threshold. Second, and perhaps almost more importantly, it seems
that in different contexts in life we might have different intuitions about
where the threshold lies. Thus, it could be that there is not a single threshold
that captures all realms of our lives, and thus, by attempting to generalize and
identify a single threshold, we are failing to take note of the fact that certain
domains of our lives do in fact have thresholds that we might be able to
identify if we narrow our focus. Even a threshold of this sort might not be
precise, but it need not be. Though it would be nice if there were in fact a
single threshold and a precise threshold, in locating a threshold what we are
doing is describing our intuitions, and it should not be a surprise that our
intuitions on matters of this sort might vary dramatically between contexts as
different as civic air pollution and giving a meal to a homeless man on the
street. In sum, then, it seems that prior theorists have mistakenly assumed
that we must have either one (precise) duty threshold or no duty threshold at
all.178
This certainly has only been a bare-bones sketch of this theory here, but
the thought is that this utilitarian account of supererogation, informed by the
prior account of moral praise and blame, avoids both sets of difficulties that
afflict the other accommodation attempts. The account of moral praise and
blame provides a single metric for assessing actions and thus avoids the
dualism of value that afflicted other accounts. Additionally, the approach to
the duty threshold described here, though far from complete, seems to
constitute a promising approach that might make sense of our supererogatory
intuitions. As such, if a utilitarian is to accommodate supererogation, it
seems that the account briefly sketched here describes how he should attempt
to do so.
2. The failure of the third attempt
Even if the account sketched above is a plausible account of how a
utilitarian can accommodate supererogation, this will not rescue the current
divergence between our substantive forward-looking view and our
substantive backward-looking view. What the account does do is one of two
things: First, it might be that it provides a decent account, in utilitarian terms,
of the murky backward-looking view—thus providing a more systematic
177
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explanation of our notion of wrongful conduct. Second, and alternatively,
even if not quite an accurate description of the murky backward-looking
view of wrongful conduct, it might be that it describes a plausible backwardlooking view that a utilitarian—or anyone else, for that matter—might adopt.
The problem, however, is that this substantive account still does not bring
about compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts (though it will be argued in Part V that it does constitute progress in
this direction). It fails to bring about compatibility because while it might
constitute a plausible backward-looking account of wrongful conduct, it does
not constitute a plausible forward-looking account. This is so for the same
reason that the murky backward-looking view does not provide us with a
plausible forward-looking account. A forward-looking account associated
with the utilitarian account of supererogation would suggest that the forwardlooking societal goal would be to minimize the occurrence of actions that fall
below the threshold that is appropriate in the context—i.e., actions that were
deemed wrongful. But, as discussed above in Part IV.A, this is not a
plausible forward-looking goal unless the threshold is at the very top—
requiring maximally efficient actions. While it would generally be a good
thing, to minimize the occurrence of actions falling below the appropriate
threshold, what we truly want to further for society is the maximization of
happiness, and there will be cases where happiness maximization and the
minimization of wrongful conduct (as defined by this account of wrongful
conduct) do not point in the same direction. In these cases of divergence, the
more plausible goal would be the maximization of happiness.
D. Summary
Thus, to conclude this Part, it seems that if we were to hold a particular
substantive account of wrongful conduct / societal goals fixed, a forwardlooking and backward-looking account would be compatible. However, it
turns out that, as a matter of fact, we do not subscribe to the same substantive
views for both the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law.
The substantive account we employ for societal goals is largely an
efficiency-based account, whereas our substantive account of wrongful
conduct is largely a murky corrective-justice-based substantive account that
leaves room for some inefficient behavior to be non-wrongful. Furthermore,
the utilitarian account that arguably accommodates supererogation that was
offered in Part IV.C might successfully describe and systematize our
backward-looking view, but it seems to do no better at capturing our
forward-looking view than does the murky corrective-justice-based
substantive account.
With these quasi-descriptive conclusions in hand, we now shift gears and
confront normative questions: Is it good that this is the way things are? And
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if the current state of affairs is not ideal, what—if anything—might we be
able to do to improve the situation? Part V addresses these questions.
V. FORMULATING THE IDEAL LEGAL STANDARD: IN THE PRESENT AND IN
THE FUTURE
At this point it should be clear that our forward-looking and backwardlooking substantive accounts are not the same. It is important to note,
though, that although there certainly is a divergence between the two
substantive accounts, the divergence might not be quite as big as one might
think. Further, this is the case regardless of whether one adopts the murky
backward-looking view or if one adopts the backward-looking view given by
the utilitarian attempting to accommodate supererogation—which is either
coextensive with or slightly different from the murky backward-looking
view.
The following is what seems to be the case: The things that we consider
to be wrongful, and thus, for which there would be liability on our account of
wrongfulness, will be both intrinsically backward-looking and intrinsically
forward-looking. What’s lacking is that we generally think that there should
be additional forward-looking goals that are furthered by the law, but we
don’t think that some or all of these things would bring about intrinsic
backward-looking liability. Thus, the substantive view that we seem to
adhere to for forward-looking concerns and the one that we seem to adhere to
for backward-looking concerns are not as far apart as they might seem. In
other words, rights violations that we think are wrongful are in almost all
cases things that lower overall utility and should thus, on the forward-looking
account, be deemed liability-triggering so as to avoid actions of this type in
the future. While we can certainly imagine some cases that are exceptions to
this rule, such as cases where one has the opportunity to kill one in order to
save five, in the vast majority of cases, providing liability for cases where we
believe a wrong has occurred—and thus bringing about a positive backwardlooking value—will also have positive forward-looking results. Thus, the
real difference between our substantive backward-looking view and our
substantive forward-looking view—the difference that is keeping them from
being coextensive—is that the forward-looking view requires efficient
sacrifices, the omission of which the backward-looking view does not deem
wrongful. In other words, the forward-looking substantive view we have
would require greater civic-mindedness.
This notwithstanding, it is
important to note that aside from this difference, our substantive forwardlooking and backward-looking views are otherwise very much aligned, so the
difference between the two is not as great as one might have thought.179
179

This does of course depend on just how numerous the cases of potential
efficient sacrifices in fact are.
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A. An Assessment of the Status Quo
The question now becomes whether it would be preferable for us to have
the same substantive account for forward-looking and backward-looking
aspects of tort. As discussed in Part III.A, it seems that the goal for any
society ultimately is and should be to maximize happiness in the inclusive
forward-looking sense. In other words, a society should strive to maximize
the sum of backward-looking value and forward-looking value of the law.
Further, the most plausible forward-looking account would be to maximize
happiness even if citizens believed otherwise. Thus, if there is no backwardlooking value at all (or if it were an efficiency-based account), having a
narrow forward-looking system that seeks to maximize happiness will be
what best furthers the inclusive forward-looking—or overall—goal. This,
however, is not the case for us. Thus, the legal standard that will be best
overall for us will be the one that strays from the forward-looking efficiency
goal just enough to appease the non-completely-efficiency-based backwardlooking value.
In other words, the further our legal standard strays from a purely
efficiency-based account and toward a murky corrective-justice-based
substantive notion, the more the narrow forward-looking value will decrease,
but the more the backward-looking value will increase. What we, as a
society, want to maximize, however, is the sum of these two values, and thus
the account we will use legally should be at the point between these two
extremes that maximizes the sum of the two values. While a curve modeling
these values could conceivably take different shapes, it seems reasonable to
assume that as we start to move away from the pure efficiency standard, the
gains to the backward-looking value will be greater than the losses to the
forward-looking value. Further, it seems that as we get closer to a pure
murky corrective justice substantive account, the gains to backward-looking
value might be less than the losses to the forward-looking value. If this is the
case, the optimal point—where the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
moving further in one direction are equal—will be somewhere between these
two pure accounts. In short, we should stray from the efficiency-based legal
standard to the extent—and only to the extent—that it is efficient to do so.
Thus, this presumably describes where we have come to as a society.
Though it could be that shifts in one direction or the other would constitute a
welfare-maximizing shift, and thus an improvement, some theories suggest
that we might currently be at the optimal point.180
What, then, does this mean for whether it would be good to have the
same substantive account for the backward-looking and narrow forward180

See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and
Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1981) (arguing that common law
doctrine evolves to become more and more efficient over time, thus giving rise to the
presumption that long-standing doctrines are, cumulatively, quite efficient).
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looking aspects? In short, the answer is “not necessarily.” It would be worse
for society to shift the forward-looking aim anywhere away from maximizing
happiness. The overall happiness of a society will be able to best achieved,
however, the closer its backward-looking substantive notion is to this
forward-looking efficiency based notion. This, as should now be apparent, is
because the closer a society’s backward-looking substantive notion is to a
pure efficiency-based notion, then the narrower the gap between the two
accounts, and thus the less the actual legal standard—in seeking to maximize
the sum of the backward-looking and forward-looking values—will have to
stray from the pure efficiency standard.
Thus, though having the same substantive backward-looking and
forward-looking notion is not something we should strive for in and of itself,
it would be beneficial to strive, as much as possible to have our backwardlooking notion approach—and ideally match—our forward-looking
efficiency-based notion. As is, our society’s overall welfare is hampered by
the fact that our notion of wrongfulness is not an efficiency-based one,
because our law must cater to these views so as to avoid too much backwardlooking disutility. The implication of this is somewhat unsurprising. We
would collectively be better off if we all adopted a more civic-minded
morality than we currently do—one which would both motivate us to make
more “efficient sacrifices,” and one which would prevent us from feeling so
much backward-looking disutility if a law or court decision were to hold a
party liable for failing to make an “efficient sacrifice.”
B. How We Can Improve Social Welfare
While it might be the case that we are being constrained and held back
by our moral intuitions about what is wrongful conduct, it might seem as
though there isn’t much we can do about this. After all, we do not seem to
choose our moral intuitions. However, while it does seem to be true that we
do not choose them, it does not seem to be true that there is nothing that we
might be able to do to influence these intuitions—be it on the level of the
individual himself, the family, the community, or on the level of society on
the whole, through laws or other policies. While various approaches of these
sorts might be possible, what follows will address the possibility of
influencing our moral intuitions by changing the law—be it common law or
statutory law (or corresponding administrative regulations).
How could changes to the law bring about a change of this sort to our
moral intuitions regarding wrongful conduct? The relationship between law
and morality is a complex one, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the
scope of this Article, but a few observations are in order. It seems that the
law and our collective moral intuitions both have an effect on each other.181
181
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On the one hand, the law is to a large extent a function of society’s moral
views. Of course, this is not true across the board: Various moral beliefs
don’t make it into the law, and many laws aim to solve collective action
problems, solve coordination problems, and codify social conventions.
These exceptions notwithstanding, the law is in large part a function of
morality. On the other hand, it is also the case that our moral intuitions are to
some extent a function of the law. Influence in this direction can occur in at
least two different ways, corresponding to the distinction (made in criminal
law, though equally applicable in areas of civil law, including tort) between
crimes that are mala prohibita (crimes that would not be wrongful if not for
having been criminalized) and crimes that are mala in se (crimes that would
be wrong independent of the law criminalizing them). Thus, firstly (and
following by definition), it might be that something is deemed wrongful
merely because it is criminalized. Secondly, it might be that a person’s
moral intuitions are affected by the criminalization of a particular act, not
because the person finds it wrongful to break the law, but because the change
in the law makes one reflect further and determine that the act would be
wrongful even if not for the law (though not but for the further reflection that
it happened to bring about).
Thus, it seems that we can aim to shift society’s morals further in the
direction of civic-mindedness by harnessing the power of the law to affect
morality—in both of the ways discussed above. The mala prohibita
mechanism for the shift might reside largely in bringing about guilt
associated with the fact that not complying with laws would in many cases (if
not caught) result in benefitting by free riding. The mala in se prong
mechanism would likely reside in a person reflecting after a law is passed
and thinking, at a more abstract level, perhaps, that it simply is abhorrent to
not make efficient sacrifices in certain types of contexts and that the doingallowing distinction is misguided.
Importantly, however, the goal here will not only be to change people’s
moral intuitions, but also to change people’s views about which immoral
actions rise to the threshold of badness meriting the intrusion by the state into
what would otherwise be merely one’s personal affairs. The fact that the law
has an effect on this—and thus that a change in the law might bring about a
change in views on this—is good for the project of change being discussed,
not only because it is a second way in which the desired changes can be
brought about, but because it seems that people’s views about norms about
intrusiveness of the law into one’s life are even more likely to be easily
affected by a change in the law than would be a person’s moral intuitions
themselves.
As for how the changes might be brought about, for one, it seems that
changes would likely (though not necessarily) be best done in a gradual
manner. Secondly, there would have to be strategic choices made about
which domains of life or which types of changes would best lend themselves
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toward being changed first. Different methods to this end could be taken.
One possible approach would be to take advantage of the framework this
Article offered as a utilitarian account of supererogation, and thus as an
account of our notion of moral praise and blame. For example, if it seems to
be the case that—in the context of a particular type of human interaction—
we currently blame people for weighting their own welfare more than, say,
fifty percent of the overall population, perhaps we decide not to jump straight
to having laws holding parties liable for weighting their welfare more than
the percentage that is equal to their percentage of the world population, but,
rather, perhaps we institute laws that would have the effect of holding people
liable for weighting themselves more than, say, twenty percent of the overall
population. In other words, we could begin by continuing to allow people to
act “selfishly,” but by allowing them to be less “selfish” than they otherwise
could have been before the change. As for which types of cases would even
fall in the domain of cases for which there would be newfound liability, there
would be many types of cases, but a common and particularly salient one—
because of the great disparity between high gains resulting from the sacrifice
and low costs of carrying out the sacrifice—might be the typical good
Samaritan cases such as saving a drowning child at little cost or risk to
oneself.
Thus, not only is the gap between our backward-looking and forwardlooking views not enormous, but it seems as though there is reason to think
that we might be able to make progress in closing the gap if we harness the
power of the law to affect morality. The closer we can bring our substantive
backward-looking view into alignment with a forward-looking efficiencybased substantive view, the greater our society’s potential overall welfare
will be. This is because the legal standard will then be able to stray less from
the pure efficiency account in seeking to maximize the sum of the backwardlooking and forward-looking values.
C. Other Factors to Consider
As discussed in Part III.B, the ultimate goal is to have a society be as
well-off as possible, and the question prior to that of “What would be the best
laws?” is the question of “What would be the best government or legal
regime on the whole?”182 It was suggested there that, due to considerations
similar to those that Rawls makes,183 the best society would likely be one
where the government operated transparently, operated with laws, and where
people would be held liable if and only if they violated laws. In light of this,
but all the while keeping the broader goal in mind, we shifted our analysis to
the question of what would be the best laws. In other words, we have been
looking into the question of which laws would have the best inclusive
182
183
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forward-looking results, and the inclusive forward-looking value is the sum
of the backward-looking value and the narrow forward-looking value (i.e.,
the value brought about by the incentives created by the law). The inclusive
forward-looking results of the law itself, however, while perhaps the main
component of the forward-looking results of the government or legal regime
on the whole, is not the only component. Also relevant to quantifying the
results of a government or legal regime on the whole are the effects brought
about by the law through means other than the incentive effects of the law
itself. These effects could be positive or negative, and could be manifested
in many forms. As such, factors of this sort must be taken into consideration
if we wish to attempt to assess a legal regime on the whole—as opposed to a
particular law.
One important effect that can be brought about by the law that is not due
to its incentive effects is the effect on people’s happiness that certain levels
of government intrusion will have. While this could be a positive thing, a
high level of intrusion might be particularly likely to bring about negative
results in the form of people being dissatisfied that their life is overly
governed by the law. Another important effect of different types of laws,
however, is the effect that the certainty (or uncertainty) of what precisely the
law allows or forbids will have on people. This will now be discussed in
more detail.
Up until now, various possible substantive accounts of tort law have been
considered. On one end of the spectrum, we have considered possible tort
laws that say merely “One will be held liable in tort if one does not act
efficiently (i.e., in a manner that maximizes society’s happiness).” We have
also considered the possibility of the law being defined in terms of
efficiency, but allowing parties a realm of selfishness that does not trigger
liability—defined either in terms of the domain or type of action, or perhaps
in terms of the percent above one’s percentage of the world population that
one is allowed to weight one’s own welfare.184 We have also considered
murky corrective justice notions of wrongful behavior as potential standards
of liability, and these laws could be stated at a high level of generality or also
with great precision and specificity.185
There can be great benefits to laws that are vague standards such as “One
will be held liable in tort if one does not act efficiently,” as opposed to
precise rules such as “One will be held liable in tort if one steals the property
of another person.” For one, if the vague law is stated to track what we do
intrinsically care about—e.g. people’s happiness—it will be more tailored to
what we care about than more precise statements of the law that serve as
mere proxies for what we do care about (as in the case of the law against
theft, which on the whole—but not in every instance—will be a happiness
184
185
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maximizing law to have). Thus, there is a benefit to laws that take the form
of vague standards.
This notwithstanding, there can also be high costs associated with laws
taking the form of vague standards. There will often be uncertainty about
what precisely will be found to conform with the law and what will be found
to violate it. Different factors are present in different cases, but the
uncertainty can exist for various reasons. For one, there can be uncertainty
about what a judge or jury’s findings will be. This factor itself can be broken
into more than one factor: First, one might not know what the findings of fact
will be. This will often depend on what evidence is available and admissible.
Second, there can be uncertainty about what a judge or jury’s findings will be
with respect to more subjective matters such as what assumptions,
inferences, or predictions are or were reasonable given the circumstances.
Another factor contributing to potential uncertainty is not uncertainty
about what will happen in court, but rather, uncertainty regarding the actual
facts of particular situations when one acts (e.g., would it be a happiness
maximizing event to drive to the store now to buy what I desire, despite the
weather conditions and some concerns about my car’s brakes?). Uncertainty
about what the law is will (in almost all conceivable cases) be inefficient. It
will lead to stress, anxiety, and unhappiness, and the lack of a clear rule will
often chill investments or other commercial behavior that seeks predictable
conditions and results.
Thus, in light of potential benefits and costs of having the law be
comprised more of precise rules and more of vague standards, the question is
what the optimal law would look like. Empirical questions abound regarding
which areas of the law would be best handled with rules or with standards.
This notwithstanding, however, there is reason to think that our current tort
system might be at a fairly happy medium. The letter of the law itself uses
vague terms,186 but, at least in most areas of the law, there is robust precedent
that makes it so that we, by and large, have great certainty regarding what is
tortious and what is not.187
It is important to note, though, that although the paradigm case of a
vague law that has been discussed has been “You will be held liable if you do
not do what is efficient,”188 and the paradigm case of a precise rule has been
“You will be held liable if you vandalize a person’s car in his or her
driveway,”189 it is not the case that the efficiency standard necessarily
correlates with vagueness or that a murky corrective justice substantive
notion correlates with precise rules. These two concerns are orthogonal to
one another, and it should not be inferred that they are related. The
186

Consider, for example, the “reasonable person” standard.
Consider, for example, all cases that determine whether a particular action is
one that would have been carried out by a “reasonable person.”
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efficiency standard could be formulated with precise rules and the rightsbased notion could be formulated with vague standards.
The point here is simply that in addition to assessing the backwardlooking aspects of the law, and the forward-looking aspects of the law that
are due to incentive effects, it is also important to take into consideration the
forward-looking effects of the law that are not due to incentive effects.
Uncertainty is one of a number of factors of this sort that must be included in
the calculus assessing a government or legal system on the whole. It is a
highly salient one, though, and one that must not be underestimated.
VI. THE SIMILARITY OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY LAW
A question might arise, at this point, as to whether the fact that tort law is
part of the common law (i.e., judge-made law), as opposed to statutory law,
is of any relevance to the debate about the compatibility between its forwardlooking and backward-looking aspects, and if so, what the relevance is.
After all, prima facie, there seems to be a relevant difference: In a statutory
system, the legislator and the judge are two separate offices, but in common
law areas—such as tort—there is no separate office for a legislator. Rather,
it seems that a judge plays both roles. Furthermore, it seems that the debate
about forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law gets off the
ground precisely because when a common law judge takes one action (i.e.,
makes a decision), the action has two types of effects—forward-looking
effects and backward-looking effects. This phenomenon seems to be what
gives rise to the questions, at issue in this Article, of what the judge’s role is
and should be in a tort case.
Despite the fact that the forward-looking / backward-looking debate
ostensibly arises in the context of the common law, it is a mistake, on
reflection, for one to hold this view. To begin with, at the stage of
legislation, similar questions arise in the case of statutory law. The legislator
is confronted with the question of whether the law that will bring about the
best forward-looking results (due to incentive effects) is also the law that will
bring about backward-looking value, and, if one thinks that they diverge,
whether it is more important to pass the law that furthers forward-looking
value or the one that furthers backward-looking value. Further, it seems that
the considerations in this context are akin to those this Article discussed
when it argued, in Part III, that given a fixed substantive notion, forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts are coextensive. Similarly the case
here: It seems that laws passed will be both intrinsically forward-looking and
intrinsically backward-looking and simultaneously further both goals.190
190

It might occur to the reader that perhaps a counterexample to this
coextensiveness claim in the context of statutory legislation might be laws similar in
structure to the Rockefeller drug laws (a system of drug laws with extremely severe
penalties). Although there was no shortage of debate about the pros and cons of
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How about at the stage of a judge applying statutory law to the facts of
the case and litigants before him? If the law is clear, then his task is merely
to apply the clear law to the facts of the case. If, however, the law is unclear
or not completely determinate, then the judge will not only need to apply the
law to the facts, but he will also need to interpret the law to determine what it
should be understood to say about the facts of the current case. Statutory
interpretation is a complex topic of legal theory on its own, and there are
various theories about how a judge does, could, or should interpret statutes
when they don’t apply clearly to the facts of a case. One of the most
common interpretive strategies, however, is to attempt to determine the intent
of the legislator, or, more specifically, to determine what the legislator would
have said regarding the facts of this particular case if he had had the time to
specifically address these facts, or the foresight to even conceive of these
facts. While different theories of statutory interpretation have different
features, most of them arguably can be boiled down to a similar inquiry into
what the legislator would say or would have said about these facts. But, as
described in the prior paragraph, it seems that when a legislator passes a law,
he is simultaneously furthering both intrinsically forward-looking and the
corresponding intrinsically backward-looking values. Even if he only is
conscious of one of these two aims, the other goal is simultaneously being
these laws, a common thought was that they had good forward-looking value
(through increased deterrence) but that they had backward-looking disvalue because
the quantity of punishment was far in excess of the badness of the crime. So far, this
Article has primarily addressed the question of liability and cabined the question of
the size of the remedy or punishment. This raises a number of more complex issues,
but none, it seems, which truly casts doubt on the coextensiveness claim.
It certainly does seem to be the case, though, that a coextensiveness (or
compatibility) claim is unable to ignore this quantity of liability issue, and it needs to
be able to provide an account that handles it. Forward-looking value is obviously
hugely affected by the quantity of expected liability, and it is all-important for an
assessment of backward-looking value as well. How precisely to provide an account
of the backward-looking value of different quantities of liability or punishment is
notoriously difficult, however. In tort, this is less of a problem than in criminal law,
because in tort there is a non-arbitrary quantity that is dictated by the loss to the
plaintiff. In criminal cases this is generally not the case, and even if it were, any rate
of exchange between these losses and prison time for the defendant seem arbitrary.
The questions here regarding the coextensiveness claim in the context of statutory
legislation and regarding the coextensiveness claim regarding quantities of
punishment are important and require considerable further treatment. Suffice it to
say here, though, that the reason that Rockefeller laws (and similar laws) don’t seem
to be a counterexample is that there is strong reason to doubt that the forwardlooking value is at all what their proponents thought they were. Further, many
further considerations arise here regarding the anxiety that people might have about
living in a society with these laws. These considerations relate to those that arose in
Parts II.B and III.B in the context of Rawls’s discussion. Additionally, it is far from
clear exactly what our backward-looking views are in cases of this sort.
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furthered. Thus, the judge’s inquiry in the case at bar is parasitic on this, and
thus both forward-looking and backward-looking inquiries would be relevant
to deciding this case where there is statutory law, but where it is not
completely determinative.
Further, although the inquiry is into what the legislator might have seen
to be of forward-looking or backward-looking value, this question can most
easily be approached by a judge asking himself what he would have thought
if in the legislator’s shoes, and relatedly, what he himself—the judge—thinks
would be of forward-looking or backward-looking value. As such, the
judge’s views on what has forward-looking or backward-looking value
necessarily enter into the inquiry.
This seems to be an accurate description of statutory legislation and
adjudication, and of what tort law would be like if it were a statutory—and
not a common law—regime. How, if at all, though, do these cases of
statutory legislation and adjudication differ from cases of common law
“legislation” and adjudication? Very little. In the common law domain, as
with statutory law, there will be cases for which it is clear how the law
applies to the facts in the case at bar, and there will be cases where the law is
not determinate about the facts of the case at bar. In the cases where the law
is clear—i.e., where the common law precedent is clear—the judge will be
bound by stare decisis and will not have the discretion to do anything other
than apply this law to the current facts. This is precisely what the judge does
in the case of statutory law that is clear and determinate in a particular case.
In common law areas, such as tort, there will also be cases that arise
where the law is not clear or determinate regarding a particular set of facts.
Here, the judge will follow a procedure that is very similar to that which he
would follow in the above-described case where a statute governs but is
either not clear or is otherwise non-determinate in a particular case. He will
ask how those who articulated the (non-determinative) rule would have
further described the details of the rule and its application in the context of
the current facts—if they had had time to articulate these specifics, or if they
had had the foresight to conceive of these facts. Unlike the case of statutory
law, however, the controlling (but non-determinate) common law rule will
not necessarily have been enacted at any one time by any single body, but
will perhaps have gradually been articulated and filled out by countless
judges over time. Just as in the statutory case, however, the articulation of
the rule over time will have had simultaneous forward-looking and
backward-looking aspects, and also, just as in the statutory case, the current
judge’s investigation into these views of those who articulated the rule will
take as its starting point what the current judge’s views would have been if in
the shoes of the others, and similarly, what the current judge’s current view
is. Though this process in common law is very similar to the process in
statutory law, the goal of arriving at the intent of those who articulated the
rule in the common law context will likely be more challenging than the
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same task in the case of statutory law, and this of course is due to the fact
that the common law rule will have been articulated by numerous bodies
over time as opposed to by one legislative act. The difference in the task
confronting the current judge in common law, as opposed to in statutory law
is, however, not a difference in type, but a difference in degree. It seems
likely that due to the differences just listed, the current views of the common
law judge might often play a somewhat larger role in the filling of the
indeterminacy than would be the case in the statutory inquiry—the latter of
which would have fewer moving parts and thus might be more of a
constrained inquiry.
Thus, it seems that the issues arising in the statutory context and the
common law context are, contrary to popular belief, very similar and almost
identical. Furthermore, it seems that the very slight differences that do arise
present themselves in the context of cases where the law is non-determinate,
and while these cases certainly do exist, these constitute the vast minority of
cases that are filed. As such, the divergence (with respect to the subject
matter of our discussion) between statutory law and common law, which was
already slight, is diminished even further.
One final clarification is in order: Not only does it seem to be thought
that forward-looking aspects of laws both can and do diverge from
backward-looking aspects, but it also seems to be thought that decisions
made in favor of forward-looking concerns (allegedly) at the expense of
backward-looking values are not only bringing about a morally unfair result
for the litigants, but also a legally unfair result for the litigants. If this were
the case, this would perhaps add even more unfairness to the already unfair
result that the litigants are undergoing. As has been argued throughout this
Article, these divergences do not seem to exist. Even if they did, though, and
thus stipulating that litigants might have a morally unfair result imposed on
them, it still would not be the case that this litigant “whose rights have been
sacrificed for the social good” would have failed to get protection from a law
that covered his case.191 Rather, these alleged cases of backward-looking
injustice are cases where a precedent is found to be non-determinate when
applied to the facts of the case at bar. Thus, a decision that goes against this
litigant would not be a decision to change a law that covered and protected
the litigant, but rather, an interpretation and clarification of the law to show
that, despite what the litigant might have thought, it does not cover his case.
Thus, contrary to the alleged appearance of such a case, the law is being
clarified and interpreted, and, strictly speaking, it is not being changed.
Of course, there could be cases, and there likely are cases, here and there
where a judge’s argument in support of a particular claim is pretextual, and
sometimes obviously so. How prevalent this is is an empirical question, and
even empirical work here seems unlikely to get at the truth (due to judges
191

See, e.g., Part I.B, supra.
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failing to admit their true rationales, or perhaps due to judges not even
knowing their true operative rationales themselves). If this phenomenon is
prevalent in the common law—and especially if, due either to the differences
between common law and statutory law described above, or due to chance,
this phenomenon is more prevalent in common law than in statutory law—
this could explain the perception that people have regarding the common law
and the alleged divergence between forward-looking and backward-looking
views. Even if this is in fact the case, though, this is not a function of the law
itself, but rather, it is a function of the practical problem of judges failing to
do their jobs.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the long-standing debate between corrective
justice theorists and economic theorists is filled with confusion and is based
on a false assumption. This assumption—which both camps mistakenly
make—is that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law
are not compatible with one another. Forward-looking and backwardlooking accounts of tort law are, however, compatible with one another, and
this Article has attempted to explain why this is the case. This, in part,
involved explaining how so many other authors have gone wrong.
Despite there being compatibility between forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts, it was argued that, as a practical matter, people
do not subscribe to the same substantive views for both the forward-looking
and backward-looking aspects of tort law. This suggests that tort law would
not simultaneously be able to fully coincide with people’s forward-looking
and backward-looking views. Thus, there would seem to be a question of
whether tort should be an institution that seeks to further forward-looking
value or backward-looking value, or some mix of the two.
This
notwithstanding, it was argued that the practical divergence in fact would be
much smaller than one might think.
In light of these quasi-descriptive conclusions, the Article then
undertook an exploration of normative questions, addressing issues such as
whether or not it is good that this is the way things are, and what we might
be able to do to improve the situation if the current state of affairs is not
ideal. Though the status quo is not bad, the Article argued that we would be
better off if our substantive notion of wrongfulness were brought into even
closer alignment with our substantive notion of societal goals. Further, it
was argued that it is in fact a possibility to reduce and perhaps even
eliminate this divergence—thus bringing about not only theoretical, but also
practical compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking
accounts of tort—and practical proposals for how to carry out this
transformation project were offered.
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In light of this, the theoretical compatibility claim itself thus turns out to
be of both instrumental and intrinsic value. The instrumental importance: If
it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of bringing about the practical
convergence that the Article proposes would not even exist. This
convergence would be valuable—and thus the theoretical claim is of
instrumental value. The intrinsic importance: Even if the above-mentioned
practical convergence were not possible, it is an important revelation that the
forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort are theoretically
compatible, because it shows that authors have been grossly mistaken both
about what precisely is at issue in the debate and about where the action lies
in tort law theory.
Thus, now armed with substantially greater clarity, hopefully we can
reorient our theoretical and practical inquiries so that they are aimed in more
fruitful directions.

